Speier, Hans. Date: April 5, 1988. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: RAND. Length: 4.5 hrs.; 65 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce.

After reviewing his upbringing and post-graduate education in sociology and economics in Germany, Speier (b. 1905) discusses his emigration to the United States in 1933, research at the New School for Social Research, work for the Federal Communications Commission and Office of War Information during World War II, and work for the State Department after the war. He then describes various aspects of his twenty-three year career at RAND, including how he came to work for RAND in 1948 as head of the Social Sciences Division in Washington, D.C., responsibilities as a division head, early social science studies, hiring philosophy for his staff, relations with management, and RAND support of outside research.

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-3 Speier's family and graduate studies at Heidelberg

3-5 Marriage; decision to leave Germany; offer of employment at New School for Social Research, in New York (Alvin Johnson)

5-6 Speier's early research interests: study of German white-collar workers, impact of Hitler's rise to power, sociology of politics, German militarism

6-8 Research on German war propaganda; project analyzing Nazi propaganda financed by Rockefeller Foundation, headed by Speier and Ernst Kris

9-10 World War II begins, Speier accepts position at FCC in Washington, D.C., to analyze German wartime propaganda

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

10-13 FCC analysis of German propaganda (continued)

13-16 Transfer to Office of War Information, writing directives to Voice of America concerning propaganda directed to Germany; decisions concerning broadcast of information on Nazi concentration camps; decision concerning 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler

16-18 OWI sends Speier to Germany after German surrender; impressions of Germany; decision concerning showing of film on concentration camps, <u>The Mills of Death</u>

18-19 Meets and works for William Benton on State Department German desk briefly after war

19-21 Return to New School; reasons for leaving government service

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

21-26 Interest in continuing to work on foreign policy; consultantship with State Department; invitation to 1947 RAND conference; conference discussion of projects proposed by attendees related to national interest; impression of Warren Weaver, and of the conference

26-29 RAND perspective on future and on chance, nature of problem-solving in foreign affairs - split between social and natural scientists

29-30 Speier approached about position at RAND; impression of John Williams

30-31 Speier's hesitation about RAND's connection to Douglas Aircraft; difficulty communicating to business or administrative types, the nature of social science intellectual work and resources needed; (Nathan Leites, Frank Collbohm)

32 Decision to locate social science division in Washington, D.C.

TAPE 2, SIDE 2

32-34 Decision to locate social science division in Washington, D.C. (continued); related 1957 budget problems (Victor Hunt, Dick Goldstein)

34-40 Speier's sense of his role as division head, as buffer between analysts and top administrators; freedom in work habits at RAND; Nathan Leites' study of France; relationships in his management role with Frank Collbohm, with Dick Goldstein; RAND recognition of merit rather than rank; impression of John von Neumann

40-44 RAND expectations for staff performance; Frank Collbohm's role in evaluation; impression of Albert Wohlstetter; RAND briefings

44-45 RAND management role in evaluation of performance (continued); Nathan Leites' study of Soviet system

TAPE 3, SIDE 1

45 Nathan Leites' study of Soviet system (continued)

45-46 RAND performance evaluation system (continued)

47-48 Speier's introduction at RAND, and first thoughts about role of the social science division; Speier's responsibilities and freedom as division head, and initial projects

48-50 WARBO (war bombing) study: idea of warning civilian populations before raids

50-51 Other early social science studies: Janis on air war and emotional stress; Selznick on Soviet "organizational weapon"; Soviet studies program (Leites, Goure, Dinerstein)

51-53 Speier criteria in hiring: government experience, an area specialty, language capability; encouragement of contacts between RAND and leading groups in countries under study; (Visit of Weizacker, German physicist to RAND, and response of Henry Rowen.) German studies, on leadership and foreign policy, and on atomic war and rearmament; French study, on government and policy formation

54-55 RAND support for collaborative efforts with universities; Phil Davison study of Berlin blockade and airlift

55 RAND Soviet studies

TAPE 3, SIDE 2

55	RAND-sponsored funds, partly used to support nonclassified research; for example, Herbert Goldhamer and Marshall study of relationship of psychosis to social environment
56-58	Factors considered by Speier in hiring staff, his approach to interviewing applicants; initiating staff to RAND, peer review of papers, interaction between staff members
58-59	Staff salaries
60-62	Development of the social science division staff; staff recruitment (Joe Goldsen, Dinerstein, Herbert Goldhamer Fred Ikle, Marshall)
62-65	RAND award of stipends through universities, development of ties with universities (consultants, summer visiting researchers), RAND staff sabbaticals and employee benefits

Interviewee: Dr. Hans Speier

Interviewer: Mr. Martin Collins

Date: April 5, 1988

Location: Dr. Speier's home in Hartsdale, New York

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

Mr. Collins: We'd like to briefly sketch out some of your family and professional background before you came to RAND. If you could just for the record indicate where and when you were born, who your parents were, and what their occupations and interests were.

Dr. Speier: I was born in Berlin in 1905. My father was a director of a life insurance company, and my mother had no profession. I was the only child. I studied in Berlin and then in Heidelberg, where I got my PhD summa cum laude in sociology and economics as main disciplines, philosophy and history as minors, in 1928 at age twenty-three.

Collins: What was the program for a doctoral student like at Heidelberg at that time? What were the prevailing views on the central elements of the study in political and social science?

Speier: You had to have, to begin with, two majors for the doctorate. I had sociology and theoretical economics. In the last two years of my study in Heidelberg, I was assistant of Professor Emil Lederer, a noted economist at the time, who later went to Berlin. Still later, he became, incidentally, the first dean of the university-in-exile in New York at the New School for Social Research, where I also became a member in 1933 when I emigrated to the United States. I was the youngest member at the time, and he was elected dean of the original group. I'm the only surviving member of that group.

Well, you asked about the general conditions of study in Heidelberg at the time. Of course in the social sciences, Heidelberg was the place where Max Weber had taught. Max Weber, probably the greatest sociologist of this century and still very widely read, discussed, and written about. Very influential man. He was not alive anymore by the time I got to Heidelberg, but

every student in the social sciences, particularly in sociology, read him diligently; he was simply the most important social scientist in Heidelberg even after his death.

Secondly, Heidelberg was a place which was well-known for its association with the so-called Stefan George Circle. Stefan George was a well-known poet who developed a kind of an elitist cult of adherents. This was a narrow, very exclusive circle of people interested in literature and the history of literature. The leading historian of the school and closest friend of Stefan George was a man by the name of Friedrich Gundol, who taught literature. He wrote a famous biography of Goethe. He translated Shakespeare. He was a very well-known literary historian, friend and sort of the main apostle of Stefan George. The George Circle was also represented in the social sciences in Heidelberg by a number of professors.

Well, I don't want to give you a detailed picture of the faculty at the time, but it was a very distinguished group, particularly in philosophy and the social sciences. Karl Jaspers was the leading philosopher in my time; he died only long after the war. He incidentally was the professor who examined me for the doctorate in this minor field of philosophy, and the other minor I had was modern history.

At that time the most influential man on my intellectual development was Karl Mannheim, a Hungarian who became very famous at the end of the twenties by writing a book, Ideology and Utopia, which was very widely discussed, not only amongst sociologists but by literary historians, by economists, by philosophers, and not only in Germany but in other countries as well. It was later translated into various other languages, and Mannheim became very well-known.

When I came to Heidelberg he had just become--getting the so-called venia legendi, meaning the right to teach at the university. He was a Privatdocent, as they called it, not yet a full professor. I heard his initial public lecture, which everybody who began to teach at a university in Germany had to give; this converted me to sociology. I went to his seminar, asked him if I could study with him, and he said, "What have you read of my writings?"

I replied, "Nothing," and I was very embarrassed.

He laughed and he said, "Come anyway."

So I did, and he was for a long time very influential on my intellectual development. Later he went to England in 1933, when Hitler came to power. When his book appeared in English, which was I think in '38 or '39, I reviewed it, and in an act of intellectual patricide, reviewed it very critically. For a while Mannheim didn't forgive me, but then later he did. I was glad I saw him again in London in '45 shortly before he died. He was in London then, and I visited him. Everything was fine and forgotten. So the main influence on me intellectually was Mannheim, Jaspers to a much lesser degree, and Lederer, also as an economist.

When I came to this country in '33--I should mention, by the way, before I forget it, that I recently wrote some autobiographical notes I was asked to give to a magazine for a yearbook on exile research in Germany. While I wrote this I mentioned the students who were close to me in Heidelberg, and then it occurred to me for the first time that not a single one of these persons who were close to me stayed in Germany after Hitler came to power. They all left. I was startled when I discovered that.

Well, I married in Germany before leaving. I married a young woman whom I had met as a student in Heidelberg. She was a medical student and became a pediatrician. She was Jewish and was expecting a baby in '33, and this was reason enough for me to leave, quite apart from the fact that I was politically active as a Social Democrat, and didn't like Hitler in particular. I believed that he was going to lead the country into war. As a matter of fact I lost my position, which I had at the College of Political Science in Berlin since 1931, and I lost this position because this college was closed when Hitler came to power and taken over by the Propaganda Ministry. So I had no job. My wife lost her job as a municipal physician in one of the proletarian districts of Berlin; and so we both were unemployed, and she was expecting a baby. I got an offer at that time to go to Belgium, which I turned down although I had no job and she had no job, because I thought, Belgium is too close when Hitler starts the war, too close to Germany.

Fortunately I got an offer to come to the New School for Social Research in New York, where Alvin Johnson, the director of the New School, wanted to establish a graduate faculty, which was at first known as the "university-in-exile." The New School for Social Research had been founded in the First World War for adult education. In 1933 Johnson, who was a liberal man with great interest in education and intellectual freedom and full of

admiration for German scholarship, wanted to add a graduate faculty and invented the name for it: the university-in-exile. The name caught on and helped him to get the money to support it from private sources and from the Rockefeller Foundation. So in October 1933, this graduate faculty opened its doors to students for the first time; the faculty consisted at that time of ten persons, of whom I was the youngest.

Before it opened, in August 1933, I was on a sort of a vacation at the seashore with my wife, and a telegram arrived from Lederer, who was at that time in London, that I should come to London. It didn't say anything else because he did not want to get me into trouble. So in any case, he asked me to come to London. I went to London, I met Alvin Johnson, and I was asked by him to take a number of contracts from the New School to persons who did not know what was happening to them as yet--that is, that they would get the offer--making the offer to them in the name of Alvin Johnson, as it were, and get their consent to come, and then telephone or come back to London, which I did, to tell him who had accepted. Some of the people were in London. Some other people he had contacted somehow, but he didn't want to go to Germany because he didn't like Hitler and he didn't know German well enough, so I was the go-between, the messenger boy as it were, and actually met a few people who later became my colleagues at the New School, for the first time.

So in September '33 I arrived in this country, three weeks after my daughter had been born. She was then at home with my wife and my parents because they couldn't travel so quickly, but I had to start lecturing here and finding an apartment for the family and all that in New York; so I went ahead. My wife and the baby followed about a month later. Well, that's the beginning of my existence in the United States. I can pause for a minute.

Collins: If at any point you want to break, we can do that. There's no need to rush on. You must have had to do a dissertation as part of your graduate work.

Speier: Yes.

Collins: What was your dissertation on?

Speier: The dissertation was on the philosophy of history of Ferdinand Lassalle. Ferdinand Lassalle was the founder of the German labor movement, Labor Party in a sense. He knew Marx but was less radical than Marx. He was also a Hegelian like Marx,

but he was more of an organizer and a philosopher of law, a very passionate, capable, interesting man. I wrote my dissertation on his philosophy of history; the dissertation was published, by the way, in 1929, and then republished in this country.

Collins: How did your research interests develop after that point, as you continued teaching and then as you went to the New School for Social Research, how did your interests develop?

Speier: Well, I should say that before I left Germany, while I was at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politique in Berlin teaching there, I wrote a book. I wrote a number of essays and I also wrote a book. I was very energetic and active when I was young. I wrote a book on the German salaried employees, the white-collar workers. The publication of the book was announced in the second half of 1932, but then when Hitler came to power in January 1933, the publisher got cold feet and busied himself finding an editorial advisor who was a member of the Nazi Party, and he vetoed the publication. Although the manuscript had been accepted to be published in a series and announced, but for political reasons it wasn't published because it was very critical of the Nazi movement, of the right-wing orientation of some of the white-collar workers, particularly the right-wing trade union organizations, and so it wasn't published.

When I came to this country later, the WPA, Works Progress Administration, financed a project of translations at Columbia University in the sociology department, I think, or social science department, which consisted of a number of German works on the middle classes, particularly the new middle classes. Now Lederer himself, my former teacher, had been one of the pioneers in studying the subject earlier, and he was represented on the list of people whose works were translated into English, and so was the first part of my unpublished book. It appeared in a mimeographed edition which was distributed to American universities, including Harvard University. 1971 or 1972--that is, almost forty years later--a German social historian, who happened to be a specialist on the history of the German middle classes, found this manuscript and telephoned me. I took the call right on this phone. I didn't know him.

He said, "Where's the second part?"

I said, "Who are you?"

Well, out of this developed a correspondence with this man, Professor Jürgen Kocker. He got the whole manuscript, which he

wanted to see. Then he offered to publish it, for the first time, after forty years, and it was published with certain revisions as a German book in '73. Still later than that, I translated it into English, and it was published in '86, two years ago, by Yale University Press. Written in '32, published in Germany in '73, and in English in '86!

Collins: The English title is German White-Collar Workers and the Rise of Hitler.

Speier: Yes. So that was my first German book. Now when I came to this country, I was of course interested in social stratification, social class development, and this, but the main impact on my intellectual work from then on was made by the rise of Hitler, by Hitler seizing power. I was very much interested in why it had happened and what would happen. So I became interested in the sociology of politics, if you will, or extending this interest which already was manifest in the book on the white-collar workers, but I developed an interest in German militarism, which I considered to be a particularly significant aspect of the history of German society. I was probably the first sociologist in this country who gave a course on sociology of war and militarism, long before the outbreak of World War II. I planned to write a book on militarism but nothing came of it except a series of about six or eight published essays, studies in this field on militarism in the 18th century. I wrote a long essay on Erich Ludendorff and the concept of total war. I wrote on social stratification and war, the types of war, on maps as propaganda instruments in war, on a number of other subjects, the fifth column and the history of the fifth column, things of this sort.

Collins: This is work that you primarily carried out at the New School for Social Research.

Speier: Yes. The war in Europe started in 1939, the Second World War, so in 1940 I think, I made the acquaintance of Ernst Kris, or Ernest sometimes spelt. He was an Austrian art historian and psychoanalyst, strange combination. He had known Sigmund Freud personally, which, given the personality cult of this profession, made his career wherever he went easier. He was a man of many interests who said he never wanted to have a full-time job because half of his time he must devote to psychoanalysis. He practiced it and he wrote a great deal about it, but in addition to that he wrote on history of art.

Now he was in London when the war in Europe broke out in September '39, and he was consulted by the BBC [British Broadcasting

Corporation] on German propaganda matters. The BBC monitored the German home broadcasts to the German population, and this was transcribed and distributed in abbreviated form to government offices in England. Kris probably didn't want to stay there when the war broke out, for long. Before he came to this country, he got the consent of the BBC that the weekly monitoring reports that they produced would be made available for research purposes.

He asked around and found out that I had published also on war propaganda, a number of articles, and particularly as editor of a book that had been written by the members of the graduate faculty, symposium, volume on War in Our Time, a title on which I decided after Neville Chamberlain came back from Munich and spoke of "peace in our time." You see, my main concern at that time was that the appeasement policy would make it possible for Hitler to survive and prosper, and so I was quite mad at Chamberlain when he talked about peace in our time after having met with Hitler in Munich. So to this symposium volume, War in Our Time, which I edited together with a man by the name of Alfred Kahler, a colleague of mine at the New School, I had contributed an essay on propaganda, "Morale and Propaganda in Wartime."

So I had become interested in the whole phenomenon of propaganda before, had written this and a number of other things on this subject. Kris, coming to this country, asked around, who works on German propaganda? He got my name, probably, and came to see me. He suggested to me that he and I should propose to the Rockefeller Foundation that they should fund a research project on totalitarian communication, which would examine the monitoring reports of the BBC, and develop methods of content analysis and see what can be done in this field. So we did this and proposed a project to be headed by him and me, to the Rockefeller Foundation.

The Rockefeller Foundation thought it was a good idea, because they expected probably--they certainly considered it possible that the United States would eventually enter the war, and by that time the demand for persons knowledgeable in the field of Nazi propaganda and the analysis of Nazi propaganda would be greater than it was at the time we made the application. It was due to this fortunate coincidence of interests that the project was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, with the stipulation that we would train a number of people in the method of analysis; so we got enough money to employ a number of students.

So in addition to my interest in militarism or German military tradition, and the impact of militarism on German politics

and society, I developed this very active interest in Nazi propaganda. There was probably at that time no other place in this country where you could get so intimate an insight into the Nazi mentality as at this project.

Collins: This was done under the auspices of the New School?

Speier: Yes. The money was given to the New School with the stipulation that we should have, I don't know, six or so young people, students or assistants, who would work with us on the project. We had even more. The senior personnel published a number of papers and monographic studies, and then in 1943, I believe, a volume came out summarizing the work of this project under the title of German Radio Propaganda.

Collins: Your bibliography here lists it as 1944.

Speier: Yes. It may have been 1944. In the meantime, however, before it came out, that is, after Pearl Harbor, Hitler declared war on the United States. I expected--well, I should say I feared, I was aware of the fact that in the First World War, there had been a very noticeable anti-German sentiment in this country, and I thought the same thing might happen again, but it didn't. As a matter of fact, some pro-German newspapers continued their pro-Hitler line. German nationalistic line. Senator Wheeler, for example, was very active in promoting ideas opposed to the unconditional surrender during the war.

So what happened was that a number of agencies in Washington that were trying to recruit German anti-Nazis--we considered ourselves at that time premature anti-Nazis in this country because we were very strongly anti-Nazi, and it was sometimes discounted because of the fact that we were former Germans, and many people were of the opinion that it can't be quite as bad as we said it was. So a number of persons, intellectuals, intellectual anti-Nazis, former refugees and so on who had become citizens, were recruited by the OSS [Office of Strategic Services]--by the Board of Economic Warfare or whatever it was called, and also the FCC got quite busy in trying to get competent people.

The FCC, Federal Communications Commission, had a Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS). They monitored whatever they could monitor, including Japanese, South American, Italian, German foreign broadcasts, but they couldn't receive the German domestic broadcasts. The German domestic broadcasts were sent on a wavelength that they couldn't monitor here. They got through cooperation with the BBC, who could listen to it.

So once we entered the war, the demand for information about what was going on on the airwaves of course became quite great and urgent. In the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, an analysis unit was added to the monitoring activity, and this had to be staffed. I was offered a position as head of the German section at first, and then soon I became the acting head of the whole unit. There, I tried to put whatever I knew about German broadcasts and German propaganda to some practical use. On weekends I returned from Washington to New York to wind up the project on totalitarian communication. I wrote all the updated material in the book, which had been closed before we entered the war. Everything that happened afterwards, I added, I wrote myself on weekends in New York. So I'm now mainly moved to Washington. I became a resident of Washington, D.C., and I worked on the analysis of German wartime propaganda. This involved writing weekly reports on Nazi propaganda and also some special reports.

Collins: Who were these reports directed to?

Speier: They were distributed in the government. We did some work, special reports for the Navy, for example, comparing the claims of German sinkings of Allied ships with the admissions of tonnage sunk by the Allies. We compared these two figures and showed the discrepancies. We analyzed the war communiques of the Germans. We analyzed the speeches by Hitler and other Nazi leaders. We analyzed the daily program, made morale studies. We had a person representing the FBIS in London to cut short the time: we were on a weekly schedule of reporting, and it saved time to analyze German newspapers in London and have the reports cabled from London to us in Washington. Our reports were distributed to various government agencies that had to do with Germany and practically every agency had, in some form or other--that is, the State Department, the Army, the Navy, Air Force was under the Army at that time, the intelligence agencies and so on, the OSS got it, the White House got it, and occasionally we got requests, from Senators for example.

I remember one particularly impressive incident. We got a request from a Senator, whose name escapes me, who said, "Isn't it true that Hitler is going to make a speech next week?" He always talked on certain occasions. I don't know, a class of recruits were graduating or something or other, or some event in the history of the party had to be celebrated. It was known that he would talk on certain occasions. The speech was sent to the German newspapers a day in advance so that they could publish it

immediately after he had delivered it. The distribution to the German newspapers was done on a special wavelength that could not be listened to here, but could be intercepted in London, so that London knew before the speech was given what Hitler would say.

This particular Senator said, "Wouldn't it be nice if you could tell me in advance what he might say, and I could answer it before he gives the speech? That would be a neat trick, wouldn't it?"

So we said, "Yes, but we won't get it quite in time. However, we can tell you anyhow what he will say." He was startled, but I said, "You see, we read Nazi propaganda; we sleep Nazi propaganda; we dream Nazi propaganda; we know everything about Nazi propaganda there is to know, and particularly about Hitler's speeches."

And it was true. We had no filing system, but since we had to do it from morning till night, it was common that somebody said, "You know what he said," and used the particular phrase. "When did he use that for the first time?" Sure enough, there was somebody in the group who knew it. So we had a really familiar Nazi propaganda.

I wrote a paper as a matter of fact, with the help of others who were interested in it, what Hitler might say. This was the type of thing that we predicted, you see. "He will talk a great deal about Frederick the Great, and if he does, this is a sign of the fact that he is alarmed about the development in the current situation, so he turns to history always, particularly when there is bad news from the front. Frederick the Great is one of the persons he admires, and he's being built up, as a man who can serve as an example for German morale and for German morale building and what not."

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

Speier: So Hitler is likely to talk a great deal about the military operations in Africa and be reticent about operations in Russia, because in Russia they are being defeated and in Africa things are going well. If things are going particularly badly by the time he gives the speech, he is likely to talk a great deal about party history instead of the military events. So we gave a projected analysis or projected table of contents of the speech, down to the point where we said, a certain percentage in the range of fifteen to twenty or twenty-five percent of the speech

will deal with history, and this is an indication that the present is oppressive for him to contemplate. This was a long paper but very specific in content, enabling the Senator to say, "Why doesn't he talk about the Russian front, and talks so much about the African fighting and Rommel's activities?" And so on and so forth. "Why doesn't he mention what is happening?"

Also, actually we told the Senator in advance what particular phrases Hitler would favor in talking about the front, that he will use. Not the word "retreat"--he'll use the word "disengagement" at the front, and things of this sort, you see. Even the vocabulary we could predict. Well, the Senator was quite bowled over and used it, and we were sweating a little because, after all, our reputation was on the line, but it turned out that about sixty percent of the stuff that we had given him was correct, or more, in the neighborhood of sixty or seventy percent, I think. So that was for amusement.

We worked terribly hard. We had a weekly deadline on Thursday morning, and on Wednesdays many of us worked through the night, every week. But it was interesting work, and particularly because the people working together were quite distinguished persons who wanted to do something in the war effort, and I think that you could have taken the group, put it into a leading university, and you would have had a very good faculty.

Collins: Did you see this activity as in any way removed from or taking you away from your primary research interests?

Speier: No. No.

Collins: It was right in the center of what you were interested in.

Speier: Yes. You see, I was too old to be a soldier already at that time, and so I thought, this is using my talents that I have for a war purpose. I had the feeling it was a contribution to the war effort, and so that was the most important thing to me. In addition to that, intellectually I found it interesting. I thought we could experiment. We learned a great deal. We had interesting people to work with, and our work was recognized.

There was a commentator by the name of Swing [Raymond Graham Swing]--I don't know whether you recall that--who was very well-known for his political commentary. He phoned me almost every week. We were given permission to inform him about what was happening on the German home front, because we knew more about that

than the Germans did.

The Germans knew what was happening in their city, but we knew what was happening in the country, because we had not only the radio broadcasts but all the newspapers by way of Lisbon. You know, there were planes coming from Germany unloading German papers and planes coming from London unloading Allied papers, and they exchanged the papers in Portugal--a neutral country--this was the place where the news was exchanged. So we had detailed insight into the various newspapers. We made analyses--our man in London did, and we sometimes also in Washington--analyses of let's say the death notices, how they changed for morale purposes, where complaints were made about food shortages or about housing shortages or morale problems in connection with the bombing and so on. All this was somehow expressed--under censorship--but it was expressed in the newspapers, and the language of the death notices changed, and we would observe this and we would analyze that. We knew, for this reason, a very great deal about the internal situation in Germany. It's astonishing how much you can learn even from a censored press, if you know what to look for.

For example, we had in our weekly reports one section that was headed "Significant Omissions," events that were not mentioned that should have been mentioned if the press had been free. Let's say a military defeat or the death of a leader or a conflict between the military and the political leadership, which we were very well-informed about.

All this was quite fascinating, a vicarious participation in the war if you will, on the German side, and so we knew also a great deal about particularly the frictions in the elite in Nazi Germany, the political leaders versus the military leaders. They had a military commentator who we knew got his information from the Defense Department and not from the Propaganda Ministry, and there were slight differences, which we had a highly developed instinct for detecting, you see, between the way let's say Stalingrad was reported by the political commentators and by the military commentators.

We got the most extraordinary requests sometimes. Shortly after we landed in Africa, Hitler gave a speech. We got a request from some government agency to find out, is it possible for us to say whether Hitler knew or was surprised that this had happened, from the way he talked? Well, we combed the speech through and through and couldn't find anything. Finally we had the following idea: that he was a born Austrian, as you know,

and it is known that people under stress use their native accent more strikingly than they normally do when they talk in their "second" language. So for example, you hear my German accent: if I'm excited, the German accent will become more noticeable, you see, and if I were in deep emotional trouble and went to a psychoanalyst and talked about my youth, I would start talking in German.

Collins: Hypothetical.

Speier: Yes, hypothetical. I know it because I talked with an analyst about this, and he said, "Of course, bilingual people, when they talk about their early youth, talk in their mother tongue and not in their second language." So we thought, if the man Hitler experienced great stress or distress or both, his accent would have been more pronounced, his Austrian accent in German. So we got a linguist who knew about these things and had the recording of the speech, and we said, "Listen to it and tell us what happened." He couldn't find anything. So we said, "Neither the content nor this kind of analysis leads to anything. He probably was not distressed." So that's the way we spent our days when more interesting requests came in.

Collins: As the war began to wind down, what did you begin to think about in terms of after the war?

Speier: Well, first of all, I did not stay at the FCC for a terribly long time. I moved over to the OWI, the Office of War Information. That must have been in 1943 or early '44, I forget. It's probably in there somewhere.

Collins: '44, it says.

Speier: Yes. While at the FCC I was concerned with Nazi propaganda, and now I was concerned with propaganda <u>to</u> Nazi Germany. The Overseas Branch of OWI ran the Voice of America, and I wrote the directives for American propaganda to Germany. My knowledge of the German situation of course was useful, and that was one of the reasons probably why I was asked to do it. I got the offer, and so I became a propaganda policy advisor, a fantastic title, to Elmer Davis, who was the head of the OWI Overseas Branch. But my real job was writing the directives of American propaganda to Germany, and this involved of course weekly directives to be written, and they had to be coordinated with the State Department so that we wouldn't tell the Voice of America to say things that the State Department didn't want us to say. My work required close contact with the State Department,

that is, personnel specializing on German affairs.

That was very useful for me, because I saw in operation the application of a doctrine that I had had to develop, or had developed myself even in part, the close relationship between what you do and what you say: that is, what you do in your policy and in your military activities in wartime, and what you say about it. It's a completely wrong notion to believe that a propagandist can do anything. It's not true. A propagandist cannot tell you, cannot tell the population that the price of bread goes up or down, if it goes down or up, because the housewife knows when she buys bread what happens to the price. By the same token, when there's a battle in Stalingrad, in the long run you cannot say it was a victory, if you are [Joseph P.] Goebbels. The Germans were defeated.

The credibility of the BBC in particular was based during the war on the fact that in the first phase, when the British suffered one defeat after another, in Europe both on the mainland and on the sea, that they always talked openly and without trying to hide the truth, about the fact that they had been defeated. That established their credibility when they were winning, because they were known to say "we lost" when they were losing. So the chances that they were believed when they said, "we are winning now," were greater for that reason.

In working for the OWI I saw pretty clearly the relationship, or learned a great deal about the relationship between policy and propaganda. What you can do with your propaganda when you have a policy of unconditional surrender: you cannot have a propaganda saying, we will kiss you on both cheeks once we win the war. You have to predicate your propaganda on the fact that there will be no end to the war unless you surrender unconditionally. That's the policy since Casablanca. Okay.

Now that was of course very widely debated, in the whole country and in the government agencies in particular and in the propaganda agencies like the OWI above all, because it was a daily worry: how do you tell the Germans that they should listen to you if you have to tell them, of course you have to surrender unconditionally? There was a great deal of debate in the country at the time and in the OWI in particular. I had many friends who thought that was the wrong policy. I always thought it was the right policy, because I remembered what happened after the First World War. I'm talking too long about this.

Collins: No, no, no, no. No, you're doing fine.

Speier: Because we want to talk about RAND. My goodness. So where was I?

Collins: About this question or debate of how propaganda should relate to policy.

Speier: Yes. Propaganda cannot make policy. Propaganda depends, gets its basic direction from the policy and from the military events during the war. You cannot say that you can make a separate peace if you don't want to make a separate peace, and you have to guard certain secrets, and there are other restrictions.

For example, we reported very little about the concentration camps, not that we knew an awful lot. Most of it became known only after we invaded Germany, and the liberation started. But we were keenly aware of the fact that during World War I, there had been an awful lot of atrocity propaganda conducted by the British and us and the Germans in reverse, and all these chickens later came home to roost. After the war, one knew that much of the atrocity propaganda was just invention, and on both sides. What is his name? (Lord Beaverbrook) the English press lord? Name escapes me. I mean the most terrible stories were distributed in World War I, and later it transpired that they were made out of whole cloth. Like using babies to make soap. Boil them. This sort of thing. The most incredible lies were used to vilify the enemy, and later this caused a great deal of suspicion of propaganda.

As you may recall perhaps or you may know that in World War II, there was a very widespread opinion in Congress that we don't conduct propaganda at all; we have an information service: Office of War Information. Propaganda was a bad word, you see. Propaganda is what the enemy does; we give information.

So for this reason we felt that we should not say anything about the concentration camps, because this may smack of World War I propaganda, atrocity propaganda. It may not be believed. It is not only important whether it is true or not, but it is also important whether the truth is believable. We felt that it may backfire if we talk too much about the atrocities committed by the Germans, because if we tell the Germans, "This is what you have done; this is what your leaders do," and include some of the things we did know, they might say, "This is an invention; we cannot believe anything they say." So we were bound in all sorts of ways, and you had limits, and you have to make up your mind,

what do you tell the people to broadcast on the Voice of America? You learn a lot about the relationship between facts and fiction and policy and propaganda.

Well, another item which was very, very important at the time was the 20th of July, 1944, which was the day that an attempt was made by some Germans to assassinate Hitler. How were we to treat this? We knew that Goebbels only waited for a chance to say that we were gloating about this revolt, this event, and would use it to discredit the participants in it: he could claim, they were supported by the enemy. So we were virtually silent about it, very factual about it. Nor did I think at the time--I thought the revolt came pretty late in the war, 1944. The war had been going on since '39 and Hitler had been in power since '33, and the military had been leading the German armies in the first phase of the war. Nothing had been heard about a revolt. Besides July 20, 1944 was a failure. Why glorify a failure? I thought. So we didn't make much of this, of the 20th of July. We reported it, but that was all.

I learned a great deal doing all this, became very much interested in propaganda, and wrote at the end of this activity, at the end of the war, a number of papers and treatises on psychological warfare. Also taught on the subject in the State Department school for State Department personnel, and in various war colleges and so on. Well, that's not so important.

Now, you asked me a little while ago what I thought about the postwar world or something like that.

Collins: What you were beginning to think about as the war wound down, what you wanted to do after the war.

Speier: I wanted to go back to the New School. I was on leave of absence from the New School all this time, technically.

Then in 1945, shortly after the surrender in Europe, while we were still fighting the Japanese, the State Department wanted me to go to Germany. The OWI operation had been taken over by the State Department by this time, and they wanted me to etablish contact with the military government operation in the field of propaganda. They had a special division for public information under a General Robert McClure. He was in Bad Homburg, having this division of public information under his command, and they had civilians and military people running it, and it was a part of the U. S. military government. They did for example the licensing of German newspapers. You know, the Nazi press was

forbidden, and newspapers had to be licensed and given to anti-Nazis, and same with radio personnel, film distribution, music. Everything had to be planned and had to be done by the military, because this was a militarily occupied area.

So there had to be some contact with the State Department, and I was sent over to establish that contact, and as such, got to see Germany from a jeep, all the cities in ashes. It was an absolutely incredible impression for me. You cannot describe it anymore. I have tried. I wrote letters to my wife which were later published, in which I tried to describe what the country looked like at the time.

One of the incidents which I remember very well, that may be worth mentioning, is that while I was in Bad Homburg with General McClure he said, "We have a film, The Mills of Death, which is a film that the American occupation forces made, when the concentration camps were opened, about the conditions in the camps and the first visits of Germans to the concentration camps, and we have to decide whether we want to show it, and when and how: to children? before the war crime trials in Nuremberg? or afterwards? at the same time? how widely? So let's have a test showing."

I saw this film, and I'll tell you, it was one of the worst experiences in my life. These buckets full of gold teeth that they had broken out of the--and so on. You may have seen some of these pictures, in the meantime, but at that time, they were "new." So they asked me, should this be shown, and I said, "Well, I think yes, but the question is when and to whom and how."

So then somebody got the idea that there should be a test showing in Frankfurt-am-Main--Frankfurt was nearby--and there was a test showing of this film, The Mills of Death. It was done as follows. Unannounced to the public, between the weekly newsreel and the feature film, all of a sudden there would be a sign on the screen, The Mills of Death, and then the film would be shown, without any prior announcement. We had some GIs in the audience trying to overhear some of the conversations, and we would invite a number of persons, of Germans. They would be the only ones to be informed of what we were doing, and they should leave the theatre after the showing of the film, reassemble in a pub in the back room, and have a discussion on the film. I was to lead the discussion. This also I wrote up.

So this was done. The people who were selected to discuss it

were some political party leaders, some women, a priest, the mayor of Frankfurt, some former inmates of concentration camps, including some Communists. I led this discussion.

Collins: What was the general reaction of the people you talked with?

Speier: Well, they wanted to show the film immediately, not only at the time of the Nuremberg trials or after the trials. They did not want to show it to children. They wanted to have the showing compulsory; you should not get any ration cards for food unless you could prove that you had seen the film.

Collins: These were things that Germans were saying?

Speier: Yes. Now all this I have written up so it can be read. Then on this first trip I met William Benton, later Senator from Connecticut, who at that time had just been appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Information. Just shortly before he opened his office, as it were, he went to Germany to orient himself a little about the occupied areas. He was detained by fog in Bad Homburg.

McClure said to me, "Why don't you talk to him? He's on our hands. We want him to be happy so talk with him about whatever he's interested in." He was interested in Germany, and so was I, and so I talked with him, and he was impressed by what I knew about Germany and wrote immediately after the conversation--he was a very spontaneous man--grossly exaggerated my competence. He sent a cable to the State Department and said, "This man must be kept in the State Department."

Sure enough, a day or two days later I got a cable from the State Department offering me a position as a member of the planning staff. I turned it down, telling Benton that I wanted to go back to the school, and the war was over, and I wanted to go back to academic work.

He said, "You can say this but I have sent my cable, and I will do whatever I can to keep you here in this operation. There are not so very many people around who are knowledgeable.

Well, I did not take the job, as I mentioned, the job in the State Department on the planning staff, but I did stay on a little while longer under Benton as head of the German desk or titular head, what was it called--acting chief of the occupied areas division. I was the acting chief because they had to have

somebody who was a member of the club, that is, a foreign service officer. I was a State Department employee but not in the foreign service. It's a very clannish organization, the State Department. I'm very happy that I gained the insight into all this, how the government works. So I became the acting head. The titular head was somebody with whom Benton didn't get along at all, and he got along famously with me.

When I finally resigned in '46 or '47, he said, "You could have made your career here in the State Department. Why didn't you stay?"

I said, "I want to go back to academic life."

He said, "You could have made a very good career here in the State Department. Of course, you would have had to do something about the titular head."

I don't want to give you the name. He was an alcoholic, the titular head, who needed a little bit of understanding and a little bit of supervision in order not to make too many mistakes. The foreign service organization is a club, stick together through thick and thin, you see, and they found out that I was discreet, did not make any troubles for the man, covered for him when necessary, and so I was persona grata. But Benton, who had not been coming from the foreign service, didn't know the rules, and he was newer in the State Department than I was, and I knew the rules, and so he said to me, "Why didn't you use your knowledge to advance your own fortunes?" I was rather shocked by this. Do you follow me?

Collins: Yes.

Speier: And I replied I didn't want to do it, and I'll go back to the school. I went back for one year, and then finally came the RAND conference in 1947, and that started RAND for me, because the year when I went back to the New School was a disappointment for me. I felt that I was a fish out of water. Once you work for the government, and you have first, very good contacts and very good, responsible work to do, this struck me as--almost provincial by comparison. So I didn't like it very much anymore. Also many of the people whom I had known, whose close friend I was, were either not alive anymore--Lederer had died, Johnson was no longer around, and some other friends had gone to other places. Leo Strauss had gone to Chicago. So I didn't like it very much, and when I got the offer from RAND, I accepted it.

Collins: Let me just ask, you're commenting on the difference between the headiness of government work versus the lesser excitement of purely academic work?

Speier: Yes.

Collins: But you started out with kind of a hybrid program, that is, the analysis of German propaganda that you did through the Rockefeller grant was part academic and part government, in a sense.

Speier: No, no, that was purely academic. It was a very prevailing interest in the social sciences, analysis of propaganda. Only it was topical, that is true, yes.

Collins: In a sense you were getting information from government sources to do the work.

Speier: Yes, right.

Collins: Couldn't you have continued that type of activity at the New School? Would that have been satisfying to you?

Speier: No, it wouldn't. The urgency of the war was gone, and while I was interested in politics and thought at that time that I knew more about the political machinery in Washington than was probably true--but in any case I thought I did know more than the average political scientist in this country. That was, I think, not completely fanciful, because of the experience I'd had. But I did want to go back to academic work. I did want to go back. I wanted to utilize what I had learned and what I knew, but I wanted to go back to academic work.

Also, I had the feeling that while I had been treated marvelously--I mean I never had the slightest trouble from the fact that I was born German--in the State Department, which is about the snootiest organization in the government you can imagine, I did have the feeling that my career would be limited. For example, as an American-born person I would have been eventually sent abroad, first as a consul and then possibly even in an ambassadorial position. I have a friend to whom I gave the first job in the States who was born in Germany who at least became ambassador to UNESCO in Paris, you see, and he was a chargé d'affairs in Switzerland. But I didn't believe that I could do this, that I would want to do it, and that it would be easy for me to do it if I wanted to do it, because it's one thing to be accepted, it's another thing to be considered for a top

position.

Besides, I have thought of myself all my life as a person who has a great interest in how people act and even in politics, particularly in foreign affairs, but my main interest is academic, and I have never had any illusions about that. In fact, my main interest is not even altogether only in social science, because I am very much interested in the history of literature, and I've translated seventeenth century novels from German into English. I have written quite a bit about literary subjects in my life. So I was not not unhappy when I left the State Department. I was glad I'd had the experience, and I'd learned a great deal that you cannot learn except through participant observation, but I did not feel that I was giving up a career.

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

Collins: What was it then you were looking for? You didn't feel a strong interest in continuing in government service. You saw certain limitations there. You went back to the New School, and you didn't find it as rich an environment as you'd hoped it would be. What was it you were looking for then, in terms of balance of a participant and an academic?

Speier: I was looking for a possibility to do some meaningful work on foreign policy at that time, because I had been working for the government on matters that were of topical interest during the war, and in the field of foreign policy and propaganda. In fact I proposed to the director of the New School a special program of research in foreign affairs. This didn't get very far. It was viewed with favor, and so I was treated very nicely by everybody, but it didn't bear any fruit, really. I also felt that the activity at the New School was removed from political life.

Collins: Okay. Let's then look at how you came to be aware of Project RAND.

Speier: Well, that's through the invitation. I was still at that time, incidentally, a consultant to the State Department. I remained a consultant to the State Department for several years; as late as 1950 I traveled to Germany to write a report for Mr. [John] McCloy who was the first ambassador to Germany. You know?

In 1948 I got an invitation to this conference, this RAND conference in New York. Why or how I got this invitation, I do

not know. Who recommended me, I do not know. It is possible that it was Leo Rosten, but I am not sure who it was. In any case, I was invited along with very many other social scientists: economists, demographers, statisticians and what have you, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, anthropologists--they all came to this conference.

The conference was organized along the following lines. Every person who was asked to participate in this big, long conference was asked to submit three projects that he felt would be particularly important to work on in the interest of national security. No detailed information about RAND was given.

In fact I remember that I inquired in Washington, "What is RAND?" I didn't know anything about it. Can they be trusted? Because I had classified information in my head, and I didn't know who they were. So I was reassured on that score. I was told, "Yes, it's a legitimate baby, and they want to talk to social scientists because they want to develop a social science program."

Collins: Do you recall whom you went to in Washington to find out about RAND's legitimacy? Was it the State Department?

Speier: Yes, State Department. They found out for me and told me, "It's okay, go ahead." They told me that Larry Henderson was the Washington representative of RAND, and I met him. RAND asked each participant to submit three projects that he thought would be important to work on in the national interest.

I think one of the subjects I proposed was something that later, when I came to RAND, developed into a book, namely the intelligence value of propaganda analysis. This was done by Alex George, who was a former, younger colleague of mine at the FCC. I got him to come to RAND, and then he did this work, which was published as a book, and he got his PhD this way. I think another subject I proposed was a study of behavior in disaster situations. I forget the third subject. In any case, everybody submitted three projects. They were reduced by some RAND people, probably [Abraham] Kaplan and [John] Williams, to a one-page sheet, and a book was prepared of research proposals, probably close to 200.

Collins: That essentially is what this volume on the conference is composed of, is these project descriptions?

Speier: Not only that but I think the volume on the conference

also reports the discussion of these projects. They were given to panels, and the panels gave a report to committees, and committees reported to the plenum at the end again. The idea was that nobody could sit in on the discussion of his project, so that there was objectivity. You didn't know who had submitted these projects, except for the people who'd organized the conference and composed the panels in such a manner that no author was present at the time when his project was being discussed. Do you follow me? Okay.

I was a little bit overwhelmed by the technology of the operation. Everything that was said was recorded. Apparently they believed in the possibility or the desirability of not losing any grain of wisdom that might come from the distinguished gentlemen assembled there, you see. That struck me as a little funny. But many things at RAND later struck me as funny.

Collins: What did you think of the presentation of the concept of RAND? I know the conference started out with a brief address by Frank Collbohm and one by Warren Weaver.

Speier: Yes.

Collins: What was your sense of what it was all about after these introductory ....

Speier: I don't recall. I really don't recall. As a matter of fact I knew that Frank and Warren Weaver had talked there, but I didn't know anymore what they had said. It's only a few days ago that I reread it to refresh my memory a bit. So I don't want to comment, to answer your question, because I'd probably give you my current thought. I just didn't know how it was.

Collins: With that caveat, as you went back and read it, what were your impressions of the introduction?

Speier: I thought it was very good. Particularly Warren Weaver was very good. Frank Collbohm didn't say terribly much really. But Warren Weaver is first, a very impressive man. I felt this at the time in general, and everybody treated him with very great respect, not only because of the position he held but because of the views he expressed. John Williams, of course, was his most loyal disciple really. He admired and adored him. I did not have this close a relationship with him, but I was very much impressed by him. Yes, I was.

I may have been also impressed by one little thing that has

to do with personal vanity, I presume. I noticed with some chagrin that the RAND people used certain words with abandon. I mean they talked of "peacefare"--warfare and peacefare. They spoke of weapons, propaganda weapons instead of instruments, you know? I thought that this lingo was very bad. First of all, it's inaccurate, and secondly, it's bad from a public relations point of view if this becomes known, and I said that, in the plenum at the end of the conference. It was Warren Weaver, I recall that, who said, "You have completely convinced me. We made a mistake." Naturally that pleased me greatly and added to my impression that Warren Weaver was a great man!

Collins: What was your sense that RAND hoped to achieve through this conference?

Speier: I think my impression was, they wanted to get some information about worthwhile subjects to examine, and they wanted to look the field over as to who might be useful as a contributor in the field of the social sciences, to be hired by RAND. In fact later I learned, which I didn't know at that time for sure, that one purpose of the conference was to find a head of an economics department and a head of a social science department, and Charlie Hitch became the one and I became the other.

Well, the conference itself struck me as very good, by and large, because people talked freely and imaginatively, and a great variety of views were represented by responsible people, some better than others, some more articulate than others, but by and large it was "a good conference." You know, I've attended so many in my life that you develop a feeling for the quality of an occasion like this, and this was of high quality, I thought.

Also it struck me as imaginative, an imaginative way of going about exploring the possibility of adding something they didn't know anything about. These were mathematicians and logicians and physicists and engineers, who all of a sudden discovered that you cannot talk about weapons systems without talking about the cost of weapons systems; you have to know something about economics. You cannot talk about war without knowing something about the potential enemy. You have to know something about foreign policy. You have to know something about the nature of the Russians and the Allies and what not. So how do you do this? By getting people together who do know something about this, and get them to talk about subjects that are of general interest to them and to us--us being the organizers--and all this was done very competently and well-organized.

I think it was overdone. It was too long, I thought, and as I said, this notion that none of these pearls of wisdom that would come from the lips of these damned social scientists should get lost struck me as funny. That everything was recorded struck me as funny. I remember that. They went too far, I thought. But it was better than interviews only, you see, because you could study the people, how they reacted to criticism, how they composed differences, how they compromised, did they compromise, how they behaved in conflict situations, how easily they got fatigued, even that you could study, how responsible they were, and so on. You could get a great deal of information about the people there.

If you get any group of people together to talk from morning till night for six days or so, seven even I think, and observe it closely, record it all, and study it later, you learn a great deal about the people, not only about the subject matter but about the people who suggest it, the reasons they give, why this subject is important, why another subject was not important. All this gives you insight into the quality of the minds of the people who utter these opinions. All this was accomplished, I thought, quite well.

Collins: What RAND people were there to make that kind of assessment?

Speier: Oh, that was done later, I suppose. It was only recorded. They had their personal impressions. The RAND people there were Frank Collbohm, Lawrence Henderson, John Williams, Kaplan. That's about it, I think, and the others read it later. I think Goldy was there too, [Richard] Goldstein. Yes, I'm sure he was there.

Collins: In the sessions in which you participated and evaluated certain projects, was your sense that the projects suggested were appropriate and valuable for this area of endeavor?

Speier: Some of them were. Some of them were not. I'm not sure that I can tell you what my impression then was, or what my impression now is because I reread some of it. From the rereading, I certainly came across a number of cases, on panels where I was not in and panels of which I was a member, where it was said, "This project is no good." The panel decided, this is not valuable for the purpose, or not so interesting. Other cases they said, "Yes, it has promise;, maybe it should be enlarged in the following direction," or "It's very good." So there were qualitative evaluations of the worth of the subject, each indi-

vidual. That was the purpose of this debate in the panels and in the committees. So RAND did get advice.

Collins: I guess a more basic question that may have presented itself to you was whether or not such an organization as RAND was necessary and valuable in the postwar world. Did you think as you went through this conference that an organization like RAND served a useful purpose?

Speier: Yes, I had the feeling these are persons with imagination, these are persons who are dedicated to their work, and they are doing important work. Yes. Some of the work I didn't understand. Much of it I didn't understand, and much of it bewildered me until I left RAND--in RAND, you see. Yes. I'm not a natural scientist.

I don't know when I first had this impression, but certainly when I now think about RAND, I think about RAND among other things as a group of people in my time, who--outside the social science division and perhaps to some extent outside the economics division but partly including the economics division--were very peculiar, in the sense that they lived in a world in which you can talk about future in the plural--there'd be "futures" you can choose from. There will be a possibility of making the future as something perfectly natural.

I tell you, it also was a world in which chance did not exist. I remember that I once talked to a mathematician--this will illustrate what I have in mind--at RAND. It might have been Williams but this is not important. It might have been any number of people. I told him the following story. "Do you know that Napoleon was in the habit of inquiring of a person whom he wanted to make a general, or to whom he wanted to give a particularly elevated position of command, whether or not he had been lucky in situations of stress or distress or in chancy situations? Whether he'd been lucky? If he learned, yes, he appointed him, other things being equal. If he heard, no, he wasn't so lucky, he didn't appoint him."

This was the story I told this man. He just didn't understand what was happening, because, you see, chance--or what in olden times would be called fortuna, good fortune--is something that cannot be accommodated in the thinking of certain physicists and mathematicians. It's too human, and it must be replaced by a mathematical formula, by calculations. It cannot be accepted that certain things are beyond rational inquiry and should be left to chance and should be left alone. I still

remember to this day the expression of complete lack of comprehension on the face of this mathematician when I told this story.

Or let me give you one other illustration.

Collins: Let's hold that illustration further, because I'm not clear on what the nub of the point is.

Speier: Yes?

Collins: Is it that the manner in which Napoleon would select a key person would depend not so much on his ability to rationally evaluate what they'd done, but simply the way things fell out in a particular circumstance that made them look good?

Speier: No, that's not it. No, no. He would choose somebody of whose professional qualifications he was convinced, let's assume that, but in addition he wanted to know whether he had this little bit of extra that is required to be a great general. Some people call it intuition; some people call it a feel for the situation; some people call it chance; some people call it luck. Now by the same token, it is known that [Albrecht von] Wallenstein, who really was a very great general, consulted astrologers. It is known that Hitler, who was--if anything--a leader, consulted I think a graphologist, and at this very moment, that many people on Wall Street who have to make risky decisions involving all sorts of hazards cultivate contacts with these "experts on irrationality." Shall I call them that? In premodern times it was very generally known or very customary in high places to attribute great importance to "Fortuna," the wheel of fortune that is not controllable by man's will and man's decision, but with which he has to live and yet make as rational a decision as possible.

So let me give you one other illustration of what I mean by this thinking. You see, they felt that--these people outside the social science division--it should be possible to design a foreign policy or military policy that could be as rational and as much to the point as it is for an engineer to build a bridge or for a mathematician to solve a problem. If you are a mathematician, you solve a problem; the problem is solved and stays solved. It's only a question of perhaps finding a more elegant solution. Once a problem is solved, it may take centuries, as it did in some cases, but then once it is solved, it stays solved.

In politics this is not the case. In foreign affairs this is

not the case. When you solve a problem, you are very happy but you can't be sure it won't re-arise in another place at the same time, at the same place later, or sooner or later. There are always problems. No problem stays solved in foreign affairs, as a rule. Once you unite a country, then it has a good chance to stay united for a while, but even that is not so absolutely certain. Look at Poland. Look at Germany. Look at this country. It took a while until it got united, and the wounds of the Civil War are not quite healed yet, and it's a while ago. So problems don't stay solved in the same manner in which they can be solved in the mathematical or physical sciences.

Yes, I wanted to tell you one other story about RAND, which is quite telling, I think. I became as you know after a while, in the sixties, a member of the Research Council. The chairman was a rotating office, and for two years I was chairman of that council. So while I was chairman of the council, somebody knocks at my door. In marched two engineers, and they said, "Hans, we want to talk with you about the following." So they presented this problem. They had noticed that the U.S. had trouble with [Charles] DeGaulle and with the Germans sometimes and with the British even, whereas the Soviet Union had no problem with its allies. The satellites, they always march the way that Moscow wants them to, they thought. By and large, if you compare the East with the West, it's true. "Now, if this is so, why don't we study the way the Russians accomplish this--get unity and support from their satellites--condense it down to certain rules of behavior, and write it up. Send it to the President or the State Department or to both places, and let's apply it. "What do you say," they asked me.

Now, you see, only somebody who doesn't know anything about politics can ask a question like that. I thought, well, what do I answer? Do I tell them something about the difference between freedom and lack of freedom, dictatorship and democracy, and democratic procedures or not? No, I thought, it won't work, and I said, "You see, we have various divisions here in RAND, and sometimes there are quarrels between them. What do we do? What do you do when you have really a serious conflict between the physics department and the social science department? What do you do? If you are in power, like certain people are in power, like Mr. Collbohm, what does he do in a case like that? What are the alternatives he has," I asked. I outlined them very briefly. "You can get the people who quarrel together and have them discuss their differences in the presence of somebody who keeps the tempers down. Or you can have an ombudsman who suggests a solution that is fair, presumably. Or you can tell them to shut up,

and if they don't, dismiss them. You can even shoot them," I said. "But there are certain things you don't do, and certain things you do do, and it depends upon the kind of organization you have, and you must understand that the East is different from the West."

A social scientist wouldn't ask a question like this. Wouldn't bring this problem to me. He knows that in a situation in which you have dictatorships allied one with the other, the most powerful dictator says what has to be done, period, and if not, his armed forces march in and shoot some of the protestors. In the West it's handled differently---so there were these difficulties. They have to do with the different approach to the world and to problems, to an understanding of problems. There are many instances of this sort.

Collins: Let's go back and examine this kind of issue historically, if we can, in terms of how it developed within RAND. Probably the first point to go back to would be, after the conference or during the conference, how you may have been approached to come to RAND. Were you approached during the conference?

Speier: No. Not to my recollection. I think I was approached later, but shortly thereafter. No, I don't know anymore. I probably got a letter, and then John Williams came to see me in Washington. He doesn't recall it. I read this in his interview. But I do recall that he came to see me.

Something else happened, by the way, which he didn't record, which is characteristic of RAND and very impressive, I think. I was approached to join RAND, and one of the questions I had, in addition to salary and various other things, was tenure. I had tenure at the New School. I had two children, at that time fourteen and eight years old, and I said, "Well, what happens in RAND with tenure?"

You know what Williams said? He said, "Anybody who is worried about tenure isn't good enough to come to RAND." Quote, unquote.

I said, "What do you mean?"

He replied, "Well, the point is that the people we have are of such high quality that we have trouble keeping them in RAND."

Which later I found out was quite true. I mean, cum grano

salis. There were exceptions, but when I became chief of the social science division, it was not a problem to get people, but the problem was to keep people because they got so many offers from universities. I think my career in RAND, which extended over twenty-three years, I got about eight or ten offers, all of which I turned down, but this included Yale, Michigan, Chicago several times, Columbia, Stanford. A few others, MIT. This happened to other people too, you see. They published books, and it was known they worked at RAND. RAND had a good reputation. It was hard to keep people.

So in any case, John Williams told me, when I asked him about tenure, "If you worry about tenure, don't come to RAND," and in my twenty-three years with RAND, I never had a written contract. Never. I had a letter, "Would you like to come?"

Collins: So after your discussion with John Williams, the issue of tenure was less important to you?

Speier: Yes. I thought, maybe he's right. I didn't know that RAND was that good, and besides, I was younger and I thought, I can always find a job, that's no problem if it doesn't work out.

But there are many things that interested me about RAND. First, I bargained a little bit about the salary, which seemed to me too low, and they made some accommodation. Then I was very much bothered by the fact that it was working for Douglas Aircraft. I didn't want to work for industry. I thought, unless you are independent, I'm not interested, and they said, never mind, we will become independent. It was just in the works at that time, and I waited until then, became a consultant while it was still with Douglas, and then when they were set up as an independent corporation in November 1948, I joined.

Collins: What were your reservations about working through an aircraft company?

Speier: I didn't want to work for industry. I had the feeling, they control us, who knows what happens. I do not want to explain to somebody who doesn't know anything about intellectual work as I understood it, academic work, a businessman or administrator or so, why I am doing what I am doing. I remember, for example, in the early days it was difficult even to persuade Goldy that it was important for a social scientist to get the New York Times at the expense of the company, of the organization.

He said, "Why should we pay for your interest in the New York

Times"

I finally succeeded, I explained to them, the New York Times is the only paper in this country which publishes documents, speeches, treaties, and so on, and you need them when you work on foreign policy. You must be able to check the file as to what [Joseph] Stalin said or [Leonid] Brezhnev said or whoever it is at a certain time, and the New York Times is the only paper that does it promptly.

Similarly we had trouble at the time of [Joseph] McCarthy in getting--Nathan Leites who worked on Soviet affairs--the subscription to Pravda because it was a Communist newspaper, you see. In order to protect him, we had in the files a statement that this subscription to Pravda for Nathan Leites was important for the work he was doing on this and this and this subject. But in general I had the feeling the business world and academic world, these are two different realms of life. You know?

Collins: Yes. Now, part of the administrative core of RAND at this time and throughout much of its early history were individuals who came from the aircraft industry.

Speier: Yes.

Collins: What was your sense of how you would be able to work with these people coming from a very much different background?

Speier: I met Frank [Collbohm] of course several times, and he introduced me also to, who was the man whom he worked for?

Collins: Arthur Raymond.

Speier: Arthur Raymond, yes, and Arthur Raymond had to give his okay, as I later learned. He introduced me to Arthur Raymond in New York or in Washington, and we had dinner together and we talked, and then Arthur Raymond said, "Hans Speier is all right," and then Frank went ahead. I mean he had to do things like that because he didn't entirely trust his own judgment outside his own field as to who was a sensible person, except that the conference had helped him, too. He had met the people and talked to them and so on there.

So your question was, how I worked with them. Well, I had some conflicts with Goldy once or twice but they were not too serious. Not too serious. You know, when I came to RAND I insisted that I could come only if it's--I have to give you this

background--if RAND is independent, and secondly, if the social science division in part can operate from the Washington office.

They said, "Why the Washington office? We are all here in California. Don't you like it here?"

I said, "I like it fine but it so happens that the documents we work with as social scientists cannot be found under the palm trees. You have to go to government agencies to get them, and you have to have the contacts with these people." Now that was partly my background. I had the feeling I should utilize this background, and also, I was accustomed to it. I would have been lost in Santa Monica at the time, because much of what I did and knew had to or came from contacts with documents located in Washington, and persons located in Washington.

TAPE 2, SIDE 2

Collins: You were discussing the reasons for the location of the social science group in Washington.

Speier: Yes. So for many years, I think until '57, I was located in Washington and had a deputy in Santa Monica and a relatively small contingent of the social science division was in Santa Monica. The largest contingent was in Washington, in the Washington office.

Later it changed, in '57 it changed, because of an incident that told me that I can't run it anymore the way I would like to. Namely, the following happened. Some budget discussion took place, and the social science division I felt was treated unfairly. So I had a deputy there, a man by the name of Victor Hunt, who was very well liked by Frank and Goldy and everybody, a very nice and capable man, whom I had known for many, many years and whom I trusted completely; he was very staid and savvy in his judgment, unglamorous, unbrilliant but very solid.

So I telephoned Victor Hunt, and said, "What happened?"

He said, "I don't know what happened, but in any case this is the decision."

So I asked how the other divisions were being treated, and why wasn't I informed? Was he informed? And so on. It turned out that the answer was not satisfactory to me. I went out to Santa Monica. I went to see Goldy and I asked, "Look, what hap-

pened? Tell me what happened? I'm nonplussed about this solution. I'd like to know what happened."

He said, "Well, it was decided to do it this way, and you are not here so we had to do it without you." And, he mentioned somebody who was in the Santa Monica office in the social sciences division: "If he has a cold and is not there for one day, the whole place knows it, because he is in demand. They talk to him, other divisions." There was this religion of interdisciplinary work, you see, and he said, "If however your man so-and-so who is in the Washington office, if he drops dead, nobody cares here." This was the phrase he used.

I said, "Thank you," walked out, telephoned Victor Hunt, and said, "I'm resigning. This is not the way one treats me," and I went home.

Victor Hunt never had anything like this happen to him, after so many years, and he phoned me and said, "Don't take it so. You know what happens."

I said, "I will not change my mind." I was so furious, but also, the language.

So then Goldy phoned me and said, "Listen, we have to talk about this quietly."

I said, "There's nothing to discuss. If that's your view, that's your view."

He says, "Well, let's get together."

I think Frank also called me, and they set up a meeting the next day. Goldy was a very reasonable man, terribly nice guy by the way, and he said, "Look, I used an expression which you with your Germanic background probably took literally. I didn't mean if he would die when I said, if he drops dead. That's a form of colloquialism."

I said, "I know. I know but still it wasn't nice of you to say it." So then we began to talk, and it took five minutes, and we were friends again, and I said, "Still I don't like this notion. You know very well why we are in Washington. Maybe we can find a different arrangement."

I decided, this happens to me only once, that budget discussions are taking place in which one division is treated dif-

ferently from the other merely because I don't happen to be there. That is irresponsible on my part vis-a-vis the people in the division. So I moved out, and most of the other people came. I left a small contingent behind. This was the end of a struggle that had gone on for years, because they always wanted to have everybody in Santa Monica, and I always felt it's easier to do it with a contingent in Washington, and then we worked it out so that a smaller contingent stayed in Washington, and I was in Santa Monica.

Well, that was the main conflict I ever had with anybody. It was not only a question of their controlling the situation. I don't think that was it. It was really the feeling, the talents that are there in the organization get utilized better if everybody can walk into the office of anybody else whenever he needs him, and this cannot be done spontaneously, obviously, by the way of flight. You have to be able to just open the door and walk in, as we walked in on Frank or Goldy whenever we wanted to. They were accessible, and I wasn't, they felt, you see, and the people weren't. That was the main conflict with the social sciences. There were other things that had to do with their background and mine.

Collins: Before we explore some of those, do you recall, was this reduction in the social science department budget at that time a reflection of a reevaluation of the importance of the department?

Speier: No. No.

Collins: Or you just weren't a player when budget time came around?

Speier: Right. Yes, and I had the feeling, sure, if they decided, okay, but they should inform me first before they make it final and hear what I have to say to it, and I had no chance. I felt, either I'm the head of the division or I am not. If I'm head of the division, then I have to be able to give them my inputs on a case like that, on a question like that, and if they don't care for it, I'm not in the right place anymore.

You see, I also stood up for the people who worked for me--or for the social science division. They didn't work for me really; everybody worked for himself. But I had the feeling, I have to be a buffer between the top men in the organization and the analysts. The analysts in the social science division were different in background from Frank and Goldy. Both of them came

from industry. Frank was an engineer, and I think Goldy, too, and they didn't know much about social science. They only found that they write, they are very verbose--which is true, too verbose perhaps.

The administration in RAND were extremely lenient and understanding as far as individual working habits were concerned. We had people in the organization who came in only at night because they worked better at night. That was okay. No question was asked. This was a mathematician, by the way, who was particularly brilliant. He always came in in the evening when everybody went home and worked at night. Or people came an hour late. Well, all right, they worked at home perhaps.

I came in very frequently an hour late, but I worked every night at home, and it was known. I wrote one of the books for RAND before I got to the office in the morning. I got up at five o'clock because it was quiet. The book was on the second Berlin crisis; its title was Divided Berlin, 1964.

So they were very understanding of these idiosyncracies that people had, but they did not understand social science. They didn't understand that perhaps there were things that can be said best not in mathematical terms.

I had one man who wanted to do a study of France, and he wanted to do it in France. I said, "Of course, go ahead." He went to France, lived in Paris. This was Nathan Leites, and I knew him well. I knew he was a most responsible person. He couldn't do anything but work from morning till night. So for me it was all right because I knew RAND would get the fruits of his labor. Indeed, a big book came out of it, but it took a long while and in the meantime he was in France.

Now, how do you explain this to somebody like Frank, who associates France with libertinage and with women? I persuaded him once to go to Europe, and he came back, and I said, "How did you like it?"

He said, "I liked the Germans, I didn't like the French." Quote, unquote.

I said, "What happened?"

He replied, "The Germans work. The French don't." Quote, unquote.

I said, "How did you arrive at this conclusion?"

He said, "I flew over Germany, and I flew over France, and I saw the smokestacks going in Germany and nothing in France." [Laughter]

That's a true story, and the interesting thing is, there is something to it. It's not completely crazy.

I'll give you another anecdote of my relations. I once hired a man who was a linguist, anthropologist and specialist on Japan. He came into the organization, and he worked for a while, didn't produce much yet. Finally Goldy calls to tell me, "Hans, we have to talk about this man for a minute. We have the reports." (They had the reports, just when people came in.) "He's always coming in late."

"Maybe he works at home? I'm sure he works at home," I said.

He said, "Yes, but in addition to that he hasn't produced anything. He's here now for six months or so."

I said, "I tell you--"

He said, "Before you start anything, you really ought to con ider the possibility that you made a mistake hiring him. Why don't you fire him?"

I said, "Goldy, let me tell you what I propose. I propose that he be given a raise."

"Why?"

I said, "I tell you the man is very good, I know this, but he is overwhelmed by the productivity at this place. He has never worked in an organization where he is surrounded by 'geniuses'."

Which he was, you know. You walked and you saw Johnny von Neumann, and you walked there and you saw somebody else of almost equal distinction. The people were very productive, and they were integrated, and they were eager. Here he was, poor soul. He came from Tokyo where he had been working under [General Douglas] MacArthur.

"He is very good but he is surrounded by geniuses and he feels frustrated. He has doubts in himself. If you give him a raise, he will feel that it's all right and he will redouble his

efforts and he will produce."

Goldy said, "Well, you may be right, but is that the way you run your division?"

I said, "Fortunately not in every case, but in this case, yes." "Try it. Let me try it."

Goldy said, "Okay, go ahead." Now that is the sign of a very good administrator, you see. I mean it was easy for me to take a chance, but he had to okay it, and if it was a mistake, it was mine but it became his by approving of the mistake, if it was a mistake.

That was great about Goldy. He was very human. He was open to arguments, and even this one conflict we had, the way this was solved I must say, in retrospect, was very honorable and mature. I was immature by walking out after this bit of a quarrel, but I was furious. So that's Goldy. Goldy was a very, very smart and astute, well-composed and calm person, just absolutely first-rate as an administrator, top officer, getting along with people, never angry.

Collins: Was he the primary contact from the top administration of the organization to the research departments?

Speier: No.

Collins: Or was Frank equally accessible?

Speier: Frank was accessible. You could just walk into his office. I could. Not everybody could but certainly the division chiefs could. You see, you would telephone, say, "Tell Frank I'd like to see him whenever he has a moment," and usually the answer was, "Come right in." He read every single paper produced at RAND. That's what he did. He read and recalled what people were doing. He had a very good knowledge of what was going on, and there are many administrative aspects of RAND which are quite admirable. I know what administration is in a government office, I know it in universities, and I know it there. RAND is tops in this respect, or was at my time.

Collins: Can you cite some examples of what you're talking about here?

Speier: First of all, the lack of hierarchization in the organization. There were no assistant professors, associate profes-

sors, senior analysts, medium analysts, and junior analysts. Maybe so, on paper. I don't know even. But people were remembered for the work they had done, and you could be a young fellow and you could rise to the top within a couple of years in your income if you did outstanding work. It had to be very outstanding because people did generally good work, but it was merit that counted, and not age, not rank. Your position was dependent on your performance. Your position, your income, your chances were dependent on your performance. That's one thing.

Secondly, it was an organization where all the so-called supporting services, let's say the library (which was pretty poor) or the help that you got typing or machinery, like this and so on, that was all, no problem. If you needed it for your work, it was made available and no red tape. It went quickly; you didn't have to fill out forms. The premium was on intellectual productivity. That was prized highly, and anything that facilitated this productivity was cheap by comparison, even if it cost money, and money for that purpose was always available. You cannot be stingy with people who are productive.

Another illustration. At one time Frank was asked by the Air Force, "Is it true, Frank, that your people travel first class by air?"

He said, "Yes, they do."

"Don't you think this is a bit extravagant for an organization that's supported by the government? Consider the fact that--" and then he named some Assistant Secretary of Defense who had travelled business class or God knows what.

And Frank said, "My people work on the plane. Let's leave it the way it is." He never changed it because he had the feeling, first-class air travel is time well-spent, since the people who fly first class in the air work, and they did. I did sometimes work on something that wasn't RAND, but I worked. I translated a whole book on airplanes, which you cannot do in tourist class.

That's another instance, how he stood up for his people, and this is not normal, not in the university and not in business, in this form. In business it's reward given to people who also have stock options, the top layer but not the analyst. The junior analyst flew first class because he also worked, and Frank simply stood up to the Air Force when he was asked about that. That's very unusual, it seems to me.

What else? Yes, well, let me give you another illustration which is very important for understanding the spirit of RAND. Frank himself had been a test pilot, as you may know, and he had one blasted eardrum from this, and his specialty was radar, I believe, he was a radar engineer. So one day he gives a talk on radar at RAND. All have these blackboards so you can write. That's another thing which startles the social scientist when he comes the first time to RAND, these blackboards in every room that the hardware people must have because they have continuously formulae to put on the blackboard. One gets used to that, and I used the blackboard many times myself. So he stands in front of the blackboard, gives a talk on radar, and the talk is being recorded. In back of the room sits a man controlling the taping and listening in so it all comes out well. Frank talks, and at one time this young man in back pops up and says, "Frank, you are wrong." Frank, without batting an eyelid, says, "Oh, did I make a mistake? What is it?"

So this youngster in his twenties says, "Well, you said so-and-so. This is wrong; it is so-and-so."

Frank replies, "Oh, you are absolutely right." That was it. You know, with my experience I've never seen anything like that, and I was just terribly impressed by this sort of thing.

Or another illustration of the same kind. Johnny von Neumann, who was one of the greatest mathematicians of our time, was a consultant at RAND. When he died, an issue of some mathematical journal came out where his contributions were detailed and appreciated. They had I think four or five different people because no single mathematician was in a position to evaluate all the great things von Neumann had done in his life, you know, game theory and computers and what have you.

So here is this great man, Johnny von Neumann, and writes something on the blackboard, and people listen. An unknown person from the mathematics division in his early twenties says, "No, no, that can be done much more simply." Like that.

Now my heart stood still because I wasn't used to this sort of thing. Johnny von Neumann said, "Come up here, young man. Show me." He goes up, takes the piece of chalk, and writes down another derivation, and Johnny von Neumann interrupts and says, "Not so fast, young man. I can't follow."

Now again, he was right, the young man was right. Johnny von Neumann, after this meeting, went to John Williams and said, "Who

is this boy?"

He said, "I found him there and there and I was told he's a very promising young mathematician so we hired him."

He said, "How long has he been here?"

"Oh, about six or nine months."

"And what has he been doing?"

Only John Williams could do this marvelously. He said, "Oh well, he has written three or four papers, each of which is the equivalent of a doctoral dissertation in mathematics."

Which was true. Johnny von Neumann looked at that, and he gave him, I don't know, it was something quite fantastic, a special stipend to Princeton or something like that.

Collins: Do you recall the individual we're talking about here?

Speier: Yes ....

Collins: We can fill that in later. But I think it would be a useful name to add to the record.

Speier: He was the son of a Harvard professor. He is still in RAND I think, as a matter of fact, if I'm not mistaken. Anyhow, all this by way of how the place was run and the atmosphere it had. You see, administration was secondary. Primary was the intellectual performance of the place, and the administrators had the feeling, we must make it easy for them. This was the difference between administration of a business enterprise and administration of a research enterprise. It wasn't run like a business. It was run like a research organization.

Collins: Just to go back to an earlier comment you made about your analyst who was working on some strategic issues relating to Japan. There was a sense though in which Goldy and Frank had some sense of what constituted performance.

Speier: Oh, sure.

Collins: What was the expectation there in terms of performance?

Speier: The expectation in terms of performance was that you have some research report or some D's or some P's at least.

Every half year they had a "salary review" which was attended by the treasurer, Frank, Goldy, and the division head. That was the group. The whole division was reviewed, each person, and the question was, what has he done in the last six months or what has he done in the last year. In most cases they knew it if he had done something important. If he still hasn't done anything, we can't give him a raise. If he has, "This is a very good piece of work, and I'd like to encourage him," Frank would say. In no major case did I have any trouble with them. I don't know how other division heads handled this, but I must say I always found it very fair and refreshingly unorthodox, because age or length of stay at the organization, nothing of this sort counted. What counted was what has he produced and was it good work?

If Frank felt it was not good work, the division head had a chance to tell him, "Yes, it was. I think you are wrong, Frank, and I'll tell you why. Also, it's my opinion--or tell me please Frank why you think it isn't good."

This was discussed on the merit of the performance. This is what counted, and he would listen to the division head. He would elicit his views, and try to be fair. But being fair to him meant that performance ought to be rewarded, and what counted was performance, and the best way they knew it was reading the papers. Goldy kept rather quiet. He was sort of the stodgier type. But Frank was the one who almost regularly asked, "What did he do?" Goldy would also say, "What did he do? What has he done? What is he working on now?" That was one criterion.

The other criterion was, does he cooperate with others well? Is he available when you need his input to other divisions? That was valued highly.

Collins: How was that measured, what kind of scheme?

Speier: You ask the division head, you ask other division heads, you ask the project leader, in case of doubt, how is he? It counted against you if you were a lone wolf in RAND. I will say that. That was not so good. For example, Bernard Brodie was a lone wolf. He was a prima donna. He thought he had coined the phrase "the absolute weapon," you know, really. He thought he knows everything, but of course he didn't. Nobody does. However, he was very anxious to use RAND as a platform for putting forth, offering another book by Brodie, and that didn't sit well with Frank. He didn't count publications. He counted research reports and reception with the Air Force. That was important too, as input.

Collins: So how he evaluated a report weighed very heavily on how the Air Force received a report.

Speier: Right. But if the Air Force criticized a report and Frank thought it was good, the report was good or the man was good, he would stand up for him against the Air Force, against [General Curtis] LeMay.

Collins: You're thinking of the case of Albert Wohlstetter?

Speier: Well, yes. Albert Wohlstetter was not Frank's friend, as you may have found out. That is, Frank didn't like him terribly much, and there are still people in RAND, or used to be in RAND, who think that Frank mismanaged Albert Wohlstetter. I have a slightly different opinion there. But I'm more on Frank's side than on Albert Wohlstetter's, frankly. But that is neither here nor there.

Collins: I guess I would just like to take one aspect of that.

Speier: Yes?

Collins: You said, "mismanaged Albert Wohlstetter." What does that mean, in terms of a top administrator working with an analyst? What's the issue there, in terms of management? If I'm hitting your point correctly.

Speier: Yes, well. I should perhaps rephrase it by saying he did not appreciate him fully, and because of certain characteristics of Albert Wohlstetter that he disliked. He was too fancy for Frank. He was not a briefer. He couldn't brief the Board of Trustees. He was so convinced that he was right, that he knew everything, that Frank felt him to be immodest, which he was.

He was a brilliant man, but--I saw him talk to an economist whom he didn't know, not in RAND but at a party--this is Albert Wohlstetter--where he gloated about his own education in economics, his own education in logic and philosophy and this and that field, and particularly in economics. He began to correct the person, who was one of the most innovative and distinguished U.S. economists. Albert Wohlstetter, not knowing this, treated him as though he, Albert, knew much more economics than anybody else. That was Albert Wohlstetter for you.

Collins: What you're saying in essence, is that he was someone who promised more than he delivered, in a sense. Is that what

you're getting at?

Speier: No. I mean somebody who claims to represent more than he is.

Collins: I'm intrigued about your remark about the briefings, because in some of the histories that have been done he's characterized as someone who is almost legendary in this aspect, in the sheer number of briefings he presented.

Speier: To the Air Force. Yes.

Collins: So I guess I'm unclear on the reputation, and Frank's perception that he was perhaps not a person who could do a briefing.

Speier: You see, we had three types of briefings, or four types. One, to the staff, and he was all right on that. The second one, to the customer, that is to the Air Force people in Washington or in various bases or what not, and from everything I've heard, he was all right in that regard. In fact he was very successful in this regard.

The third type of briefing was to the board of trustees. The board of trustees was an important organization--this is also important in understanding RAND--not as in a business organization. Our board included very distinguished scientists, some of them Nobel Prize laureates, and the discussions with the board after a briefing were professional discussions. It's not that the board member would ask you, "How did you mean this? How did you mean that? I didn't follow you here or there." They would argue the points of the briefing with you, the merit of the case you had presented so it was entirely different from a briefing let's say of an ad agency. You get my drift.

And in this kind of briefing, I don't recall a single briefing by Albert Wohlstetter. He was never chosen for that because he started to ramble or--I don't know what happened. He wasn't coherent. Whereas [Herman] Kahn, whom Frank didn't like either, was a very good briefer. There were still other types of briefings but let's not go into that. In any case I don't recall any briefing by Albert Wohlstetter to the board of trustees. I don't recall a single one in twenty-three years, and I attended them all.

Collins: That was a bit of digression.

Speier: Yes.

Collins: What I want to return to is this question of evaluating performance of staff members. So there were the factors of, I guess, an inherent quality as well as reception by the customer. But I guess I'm curious, in the case of evaluating materials produced by your department, where Frank and Goldy had very limited background, how could they come to a judgment about the quality of a product?

Speier: I don't know.

Collins: I was wondering if you had a sense of how Frank and Goldy evaluted these.

Speier: I think partly they took my word for it. They read it all. They complained about the lengths of the reports very frequently, particularly in the case of Nathan Leites. But then you see, I tried to protect the people, too, and I tried to meet the needs and made it more operational.

For example, Nathan Leites wrote a book this big on the--I have it here somewhere--Bolshevik system, and it was so big that nobody wanted to publish it. Nobody wanted to read it, and I argued with him, other people in the division argued with him, that it had to be presented somewhat differently in order to get to the reader. He was very resistant, was imperious and felt he had done the best he could, and nobody knows as much as he does on the subject, which was true.

Well, Frank and Goldy frankly thought it was just unusable, and so I had the idea that he should write a short version of it, partly in order to get him to get through to Frank and Goldy, and partly to get through to other readers like Frank and Goldy. I remember we had a meeting in Washington, where I still lived at the time. In the garden we were sitting together with a friend, Herbert Goldhamer, who was a member of the division like Leites.

I said to him, "Look, why don't you write a short abstract as a book? That will show the people in RAND and the administration that what you are doing--they can't read a book that long, as you have written, adequately, but they can read short texts adequately. Also it will help you." He resisted this as only an author can, and I almost literally went down on my knees imploring him to do it. Well, finally I persuaded him to do it, and he wrote The Operational Code of the Politburo, which became a sensational success. It was an instrumental book in the peace

negotiations at the end of the Korean War in Panmunjon. It was used there. It was cited by the Navy, by the Air Force, by the Army, by everybody except some experts outside RAND. They came to me and said, "Why don't you stop him? It's an absolute insult to intelligence to be so anti-Russian," and so on and so forth.

I said, "Put your objections down in writing, send them to Leites. He will answer each one according to its merit."

TAPE 3, SIDE 1

Speier: You have to ask me again what you wanted to know.

Collins: Yes. Just before we broke for lunch, you were talking about how the performance of staff members was evaluated, and you related the case of Nathan Leites and his study of the Soviet system. So there was a question of how results were presented as well, that was in part a factor in evaluating staff members' performances. Is that fair to say?

Speier: I don't quite know what you imply in this little word "how."

Collins: Well, in his case there was a very lengthy, what in their view was essentially an unreadable study. It needed to be presented in a format where the principal findings were readily digestible.

Speier: Yes. And this, incidentally, should not be held against the RAND administration only, because he tried to get this manuscript published several times and was rejected by various puublishers because of unreadability, and it was I who got him published. I talked to a publisher personally. I had contacts with him. That's the way it was published, and I considered this one of my merits at RAND, that I got this book published. But he had trouble with it himself.

Collins: Okay. As we were talking about the research function in relation to production and evaluation of performance, you had these biannual review. Now I would assume that some research activities had a longer gestation period than others.

Speier: Yes.

Collins: It required a longer time to reach findings. Was it more difficult to accommodate that kind of research project in this system of evaluation?

Speier: I don't think so. Frequently it happened for example that somebody was a member of a team, and the whole project was a team project, and if that took longer, the performance of this particular member of the team would have to be evaluated somehow and other than by looking at the written product. Even if you had the written product, you could not single out the contribution of this individual person from the report, but you had to talk to the project leader, and to the division head or division heads, who usually were relatively well-informed because they kept track of what people were doing. You had to rely on that composite judgment instead of the product which was not assignable to an individual person.

So, sure, it was flexibly used, this rule, and I don't even know how it was handled in cases of persons who only worked in teams. There were such. Whereas in the social science division, you had a high incidence of individual performances. We wrote books, and many books were published by the social scientists.

So there were various methods of setting salaries, and it is possible that prior to the salary review, which happened as I said every six months, either Goldy or Frank Collbohm talked to the project leaders also. Maybe they were even called in sometimes to the discussion of the individual who was being considered. In any case, they tried to be as responsible about it as they could be.

Only in my case, in the case of the social science personnel, it was mainly, though not exclusively, a question of what have they written as individuals or in groups of two or three. There were individual differences. Even Leites did some cooperative work, too; he was consulted. But Brodie, for instance, was a lone wolf throughout his association with RAND. That was resented by some people, and there were some--rivalries is too much, but probably differences of opinion about the worth of individuals, and Brodie was one of those who was controversial. A man like Wohlstetter or the person you want to talk to, I mentioned before, what was his name? Bill Kaufmann. You will probably get a different view from him on Brodie than you might get from a few other people you might talk to.

Collins: Well, this could lead us into a discussion of this question of interdisciplinary research, but I think probably it would be better to go back to the beginning, and kind of outline how projects developed in the social sciences, and then we can tackle this question of interdisciplinary research.

Speier: Yes.

Collins: So initially you were contacted by Williams. He presented the picture of RAND to you. You were attracted to it. What did you find when you first came to RAND, and what were your thoughts about how you would go about building up a social science division at RAND?

Speier: I first came to RAND as a consultant because while RAND was still associated with Douglas Aircraft, I was not an employee, I was a consultant. Then I developed a bursitis, a very painful shoulder disease, and could not function too well. I could hardly write for a while. Also, while I was waiting for RAND to become independent, Frank and others had the job to find some employment for me as a consultant. What should I do as a consultant?

I asked him, "Sure, I'll consult, but what about?" So Frank--this is a typical RAND idea--said, "Write a memorandum for me on where you want the social science division to be ten years from now."

Not bad, I thought, but not so easy to do. So I wrote it, but I remember not much. If RAND were to preserve papers, but it's a very irreverent organization as far as history is concerned, you could read it still. I don't have it anymore. I do recall that I made the statement in there, ten years from now there will be a branch of the social science division in Tokyo and another one in Paris, because it's provincial to think that American social science, done for RAND in the interest of national security, could be confined to the United States. Later, I also advocated very strongly that RAND should broaden its interests from the primarily SAC-oriented research, that is Strategic Air Force Command research, to include problems of the alliance system, NATO in particular, and I made this point very strongly.

Collins: In this memo that was to look forward for ten years.

Speier: Yes. But also later, when I joined RAND as an employee, I was the one who was most active in trying to persuade Frank--it took some persuading--to extend the Project RAND activities, to the alliance system at large. To work not only for the Strategic Air Force but also for the Tactical Air Force and for

the overseas commands and so on, on subjects of interest to them and of interest to the nation as a whole. I thought that NATO was terribly important, quite apart from the fact that I knew more about NATO than about the Strategic Air Command when I arrived at RAND. So in a sense I was speaking pro domo but I felt that that was a legitimate concern on my part: an organization that wanted to make its mark with the Air Force should not be overly specialized and work exclusively for SAC. You know, at the time you spoke of SAC, and you meant SAC, and when you spoke of the Air Force, you meant everything in the Air Force but SAC.

Collins: Let me just quickly ask. When you were working as a consultant, it was understood that you were to become the head of the social science division, is that correct?

Speier: Yes. As far as I can recall. In any case when I came to RAND, I was asked--whether I was then as a consultant still I don't recall--to draw up a research plan, initial research projects for the social science division, and of the personnel and of their salaries. I was given complete freedom with respect to the personnel, the salary level at which they should join RAND, and with respect to the work to be pursued by the division. Nothing, not a line of the suggestions that I made was changed by RAND, by the top management, partly because they had confidence and partly because it made sense to them, I don't know, and partly because they didn't know any better, because they were not experts in that field. Now, do you want me to talk about the first projects as I recall them?

Collins: Do you recall the basic thrust of what you recommended as an initial project?

Speier: Yes. I think that there were two or three subjects that I recall, that were initial projects. One was a study of disasters, disaster studies, another was the "WARBO" study--Warning in Advance of Bombing, a third topic was the psychology of reaction to air war, the emotional stress. All three were early projects. One other proposal I had made was the one mentioned before, on the intelligence value of propaganda analysis. Alex George worked on that. I knew that Leites wanted to work on the Soviet Union, and I also advocated very strongly that we should enlarge the RAND project with the help of the economists and the social scientists to include studies on Soviet Russia, not only on strategic bombing and weapons systems.

Now the WARBO study was the first collective project. That is, this wasn't assigned to any individual person but we worked as a division on it, and anybody who could possibly contribute to it, did. This series of working papers that you sent me indicates that. The study itself had the following orientation or

thrust, if you want to call it that. During the war I was very much taken aback by the American and British strategy that aerial bombing can lead to surrender, because I believed that by aerial bombing you do not affect the morale of the people negatively, but you strengthen their dependence on the government although they may hate it. After a devastating raid, people need shelter, they need blankets, they need work, they need food, they need water, they need many necessities of life, and where can they get them but from their government? They can't go searching for water the way you search for wood in the woods, and you can't find jobs unless you have somebody with authority in a community completely disorganized by the bombing.

So I thought it was just a silly idea to think that by bombing raids you can get the people to overthrow totalitarian regimes. That made no sense. Of nothing I was surer during the war than of that.

Incidentally, I was borne out after the war by the so-called Strategic Bombing Survey, conducted in Japan and in Germany. In Germany, despite the bombing, war production went up, except for the last few months of the war, not down. The disruption came mainly in the very last phase of the war, and to a very large extent through tactical bombing of bridges and the disruption of the transportation system, and for some other things. There was some fuel shortage also. They didn't have enough fuel for aircraft training missions and so on.

But the whole idea of bombing civilians was not only distasteful to me, regardless of the fact that I was no friend of the Germans during the war, but it was also inefficient, it seemed to me, from the point of view of ending the war sooner. I thought about these two combinations, of making bombing more efficient and making it more humane, if you will. I thought, if it were only possible to find a way of bombing, strategic bombing, that would not kill so many civilians, it would be better.

But how to do it without cutting into the guts of the Air Force? After all, they are in the business of throwing bombs in wartime. So I thought, one way of doing this would be to warn the civilian population that raids would be coming, but not warn, let's say, Berlin if Berlin was going to be bombed, but warn Munich, Berlin, Vienna and I don't know, some other city, four or five, and say, "One of you will be bombed the day after tomorrow." Or between the day after tomorrow and today. "And those of you who want to escape this leave your city!" That would lead to disruption without bombing of civilian activities. It would lead to saving lives and in that sense be more humane, and it would be followed if it became known that this was indeed the new strategy. We tried to investigate this and tried to square the

circle of making a more humane bombing more interesting to the Air Force because it would be more efficient than the inhumane bombing of unannounced targets, you see.

Well, that's the whole idea. Not a bad idea, I think to this day, and in fact we succeeded in selling it to the Air Force. First of all, RAND was very suspicious. What are these social science characters up to? Then they saw that this came out, and they thought, now that's something imaginative. It makes sense, it isn't starry-eyed, it isn't too soft, they liked it. Even the skeptics with regard to social science liked it, in RAND, and also the Air Force liked it. In fact, the idea was used in some modified form, I forget now which form, but it was used during the Korean War. This was very important in establishing the social science division within RAND and within the Air Force.

Collins: Did you brief this study to the Air Force?

Speier: I forget.

Collins: Did your staff?

Speier: I forget. I think it was briefed. I'm almost certain it was. I know that it was briefed to the trustees, and I briefed the trustees very often. For some reason or other Frank thought I was good at that, and I did it very often--much too often, I thought. Yes, I did it there and impressed them a great deal. In fact, one of the trustees whose name escapes me told me that this same principle of warning in advance of military action was used by the British in suppressing uprisings in their colonies.

Another study dealt with air war and emotional stress. It was done by Irving Janis, a psychologist at Yale, he did a very good piece of work as a consultant to RAND. That is available as a book published in the early fifties. Very early. I could give you the exact date if you want to.

Collins: You can fill that in later.

Speier: Yes (1951). Another early study was done by Philip Selznick on "The Organizational Weapon." That was an individual piece of work, too. Selznick was a young sociologist who studied an important aspect of Communist tactics abroad in times of peace. Selznick analyzed how the Communists use organizations in the target country for their political ends. I mean, bookstores distributing material, or the parties, and so on. It was quite a good book. Unfortunately Selznick left us soon thereafter, and that was the only major piece of work that he did for RAND. He liked it very much at RAND. He considered Paul Kecskemeti a very

able and versatile member of the social science division as "the typical European intellectual." Selznick said he never knew what that word meant until he met Paul, who was indeed quite an extraordinarily gifted man.

I said, "But why do you want to leave, if you like some of the people, and you like the work?"

He replied, "I'll tell you why I want to leave: it is too strenuous for me." He said, "The expectations are so high. You always have to produce."

I said, "You don't always have to produce. You have to work at it, yes."

Well, that was of no avail. He wanted to be in a calmer environment. It was too overheated, he felt, and so he left us, unfortunately. He was with us for quite a while, a few years, and he went to Berkeley and became a sociologist there and wrote a textbook and made a fortune on it.

Then we organized a whole program of Soviet studies, not only "The Organizational Weapon," but Leites's important work, and then there were studies done primarily by Herbert Dinerstein and Leon Gouré on Soviet military doctrine. (Gouré, Gourevich originally, was Russian by birth I think.) They both worked on Soviet military doctrine, and Gouré later also on Soviet civil defense and other subjects.

When I started hiring people, I favored people whom I knew well, e.g., Hunt, Leites, George, Goldhamer. Next, I valued highly some government experience--this was shortly after the war after all. In fact I can think of no one without some experience in some government organization in Washington or abroad.

Third, I liked as many members of the division as possible to be specialists on one particular area of the world. This implied that they should speak the language of the country they were interested in. I once made a head count and found that we had more languages spoken in the social science division than there were analysts. That's pretty good. Indeed, we had people who knew Scandinavian languages and French of course, Russian, German, Hungarian, etc. and by knowing I mean speaking, understanding, reading, and writing the language.

Why was this important? I felt it was important that in the cases where we could visit the country that we should establish contact with the leading groups in the country, representative of the political parties, of the government, military leaders, business men, publishers, journalists, scientists, and so on. We

referred to that as "elite studies." This was done in France, this was done in Germany, where I myself did a great deal of fieldwork with respect to the military. I talked to practically every important German general in World War II, in the postwar period, about the question of German rearmament and the requirements of the defense of NATO, and to all the important politicians of all parties.

In addition to that I personally organized many, many travels of important Germans to come to RAND as visitors: deputies in parliament, foreign ministers, diplomats, ambassadors, defense ministers, some scientists and church dignitaries. Once we had a visit by a cardinal and his entourage. They came to RAND, to look this place over, give a lecture, discuss with us what was of interest to them and to us. In some cases it led to even lasting friendships.

Once it led to a minor disaster. I once invited [ ] Wëizsacker, the physicist, to come to RAND, whom I had known, and he came, and he was the head of a very important research organization at the time. So I said, "If you come, why don't you discuss your research project with us, because you are a scientist and we are scientists, so there would be an interest in the subject, what you do in Germany."

He was the most important atomic physicist in Germany at the time, very much against atomic war and opposed to German access to atomic weapons. So he gave a talk. This was already after Frank had retired, under his successor--I forget now what's his name. He's now at Stanford.

Collins: Henry Rowen?

Speier: Yes, Henry Rowen. I went to Rowen and suggested he should also attend the lecture. I asked the division chiefs to come and had a small group of distinguished RAND-ites listen to the talk. So Wëizsacker talked about his intentions, what he wanted to do in the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft I think it was called. He had a very ambitious program. I was the chairman, and, as was RAND practice, after a presentation there's a discussion, and once the president of the organization was there, it was only polite on the part of the chairman to ask the president to have the first word.

So I asked Henry, "Do you wish to make a comment?"

Henry Rowen said, "Yes, I do. Mr. Wëizsacker," he called him, "You have told us what you want to do. Now tell us please what you don't want to do."

There was dead silence. You know, Rowen was annoyed; he thought it was an insult to RAND for the speaker to think that he can do all this. Instead of talking sense, he wanted to shine in the glory of his organization, that was going to do all these projects. I had a very tough time as chairman to save the situation. I said something to the effect that we were all so terribly impressed by the ambitiousness of his program, and that he must understand, in the frankness of a discussion that was customary in RAND, that this question would be raised. In fact, it was foreseeable that it would be raised. I tried to get people to laugh, but it was awful. It just was absolutely awful due to Rowen's impolite brusqueness.

On the whole, however, we had some very good results with this policy of trying to get foreigners to come and talk to us. We had people from Japan. Whenever possible, we organized close contacts. We used to have close contacts with people who are interested in foreign policy and knowledgeable on foreign policy and military affairs, and we laid our cards open on the table as far as we could do it without violating secrecy, (different from Mr. [Daniel] Ellsberg) and showed them, or told them what we were thinking and what interested us. They were interested in how we cooperated with the universities, how we recruited people, how the place was run, how salary schedules were set, who financed the work, how we managed to maintain scientific integrity, whom we reported to, etc.

Collins: Just like me.

Speier: Yes. Sure, and this made for very good rapport, you see. When you went to, let's say, Germany, the first few times it was complicated, but then you just made the rounds, as it were. You saw the same people or you got handed on to another person and so on.

Now, as far as the German work was concerned, this resulted in two books. One was a symposium volume on German leadership and foreign policy, discussed the government elite and the political parties and the trade unions and the various organizations that had an impact on German foreign policy. The second volume, I wrote myself alone, was called, German Rearmament and Atomic War, which was the report of the results of visits with people knowledgeable in military affairs, in addition, I had some round table discussions in Germany on anxiety about air attack and civil defense problems.

In France it resulted in a book, which Leites wrote in cooperation with the French parliamentary secretary of some party in France, on the House Without Windows, very intricate French practices in forming governments and shaping policy. Very insightful also on French policy.

Collins: In other words, you were encouraging collaborative ventures between RAND staff members and people in other countries.

Speier: Yes, just as we were encouraging collaborative efforts in this country with universities. To promote this, we gave stipends without any conditions attached to it to certain universities. We let the faculty decide who should get it; it should be used for graduate research. That was the description of it. Not in this field or in that field, of military interest or not. We wanted to support research, but not determine its specific orientation. On my initiative, the only foreign university that got this was Berlin, the Free University of Berlin got a grant for several years, three or four years. Still at the beginning of the Vietnam War, they got it. So and so much money, and we hardly knew whom it was given to. I think RAND didn't even keep a list of the people whom it was given to. We just gave it to the university. Columbia got one grant, I think Chicago did, and so on.

In addition, we made arrangements with universities for work that was done by a young RAND-ite, to be considered in its finished form by the university, as to whether or not it met the standards of a doctoral dissertation. That's the way for example Alex George got his doctorate degree from Chicago. Another person, Phil Davison, W. Phillips Davison, who is now professor at Columbia (if he's not retired yet), wrote a book on the Berlin blockade, on the airlift at the time of the Berlin blockade. Our notion was that the Air Force is an organization that can be used in peacetime for advancing policy objectives, as can all military organizations. You can advance policy objectives by naval maneuvers or by mobilization or by sending a coast guard mission. Similarly, we used an airlift to save a city, which would have fallen to the Communists without it. Probably the greatest peaceful, greatest humanitarian mission ever performed by any military organization.

In any case, we had the idea--and Phil Davison was interested in studying what had happened in Berlin at that time. We always had the rule: try to <u>create</u> data and not only use those that exist. By creating data we meant, in this case for example, go around and interview people about their memories of the airlift. Get children in schools to write essays--and make money available for the best essay--on "my memories of the airlift," for children Do the same thing through a newspaper ad--get people to write in letters about their memories of the airlift. The book contains a great deal of material not to be found anywhere else about what it meant to the Berliners to have the airlift.

Now I submit that this was a good social science study; it was translated into German and created a great deal of goodwill

in Germany and helped also to dispel some of the notion of RAND being a warmongering organization. In some quarters this view was held, and this bothered me a little. I don't think we have ever worked on any kind of a "warmongering" subject in the social science division.

We certainly did work on the Soviet Union, where I personally was very much interested in "atomic blackmail." I think I was the one who used this phrase, before [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower made it popular in the fifties. I studied the technique as used by [Nikita] Khrushchev. You know, he tried to intimidate all the NATO allies--there would be no Acropolis left, he told the Greeks, Britain will be one vast cemetery, and so on. This was the way he talked about NATO and tried to undermine NATO solidarity. So we studied these techniques. I particularly studied this. I wrote also an essay on Soviet atomic blackmail

TAPE 3, SIDE 2

Speier: Yes, I wanted to mention about programs, one other thing. Social scientists perhaps more than physicists or mathematicians, associate productive intellectual work with the production of books to which their name is attached. Now that created some sort of difficulty in RAND, inasmuch as much of the work done remained, if not anonymous, but classified. RAND soon organized a type of research which was called RAND-sponsored research. Do you know about that?

Collins: Yes. Derived from their overhead.

Speier: From their overhead. Right, and some of these funds were distributed to staff members who then could work on a project without worrying about classification. One of the first books of this sort was produced by [Herbert] Goldhamer and [Andrew] Marshall on Psychosis and Civilization. It was a statistical study of the incidence of psychosis over a long period of time, something like sixty or eighty years, where the authors got statistical data. They wanted to examine statistically the hypothesis that the incidence of psychosis is not influenced by the advance of civilization. That is, under more highly complicated technological, urban bureaucratic conditions, you get more psychosis than in less developed circumstances. The result by the way was: there is no change. It's different with neurosis, but psychosis is independent of the social environment, social and technical environment. Interesting. This study was widely hailed after it was published in book form. It was widely hailed by statisticians as a path-breaking application of statistics to history.

Collins: Okay. Well, we got off on this thread, initially talking about the characteristics you tried to encourage in your staff members. So just to summarize: you were looking for people who had some government experience, individuals who were interested in building up contacts with members of the elite in those countries in which they had expressed interest. Were there any other factors that went into your conception of what individuals would fit well in the social sciences division?

Speier: Well, of course staff members should have a good specialized training, but it didn't matter whether it was in political science or in psychology or social psychology. We didn't have an economist at first. We had a logician. We had a statistician. We had historians. The point was that when I was asked about a member of the staff, "What is he by training?" I always had to think, because I thought of him as a social scientist or as an expert on Hungary or as an expert on Holland. The professional competence, the professional training, while a requirement, became unobtrusive in the work at RAND, because each staff member worked on subjects he was interested in and this subject would never be subsumed under a narrow academic discipline, like social psychology. So I don't recall a single instance where I said, "We don't have enough social psychologists," or "We don't have enough sociologists," or "We would need somebody who knows more about clinical psychology," or what have you. But I do recall instances when I said, "If we only had someone who knows something about this or that country," because we didn't have them.

Collins: This might be a good point to relate what we discussed at lunch briefly in terms of your approach during the interview process.

Speier: Oh, yes. Want me to repeat that briefly?

Collins: Yes.

Speier: Before hiring people I always interviewed them, after having read their resume and vita. At the end of each interview, if I was dissatisfied, the session was terminated at this point. But if I was satisfied with the interview, and this was a candidate that I was seriously considering, he would still have to scale two hurdles.

The first hurdle: I asked him, "We all have to work to make a living, but suppose you were fortunate enough not to be in that position because you had inherited a lot of money--what would you want to do?" I was waiting for the answer, "I would still do research." If he then told me, "I would go and visit Bengal or the Ice Cap," I would say, "Well, sure, who wouldn't," and that

would be the end. I wanted to find out the seriousness of dedication to scientific work. With one question it's hard to do, but this seemed to be as good as any single question.

And the second question, which I asked if he had scaled this hurdle, was what particular subject he would want to work on. Most people were at first stunned by it. But some people would then gradually come around and say, "I would like to work on this and that subject." Then I asked him "Why?" to get a feel for his seriousness as a researcher.

And if he had passed all these "tests," then I would say, "Well, I'll see you soon, and we'll talk about salary and other things." Now in some cases I was even successful in finding a subject that was close to what he had told me he would like to work on. But what interested me most was not whether I could find that project, but whether he was really dedicated to research and knew what he wanted. I think that was a good technique of exploring the potentialities of a researcher, or at least his motivations. I don't know whether it's universally valid. In fact, one person once told me it's a silly question, and then I asked him, "Why do you think that?" But you could talk about this subject, and the answers--all answers, no matter what the answer was, gave you a better insight into the kind of researcher this man might make. It didn't prove that he would be a first-rate mind, but it always showed, I believe, something important that I would not get from his resume or from the earlier part of the interview.

Collins: Assuming somebody went through the interview process, and you decided you wanted him to join the staff, did you have any particular way of introducing him to the work of RAND? Would he be asked to participate in a particular project or tackle a particular subject, or would you simply turn them loose and say, "Study what you think is best." How would they acclimate themselves?

Speier: I think it was a mixture of all this. We had staff meetings. We had projects being discussed. We had the process of very closely reviewing drafts of papers that somebody was writing. It was a sort of peer review that you have normally in submitting a paper to a learned journal, and this was taken very seriously. The reviews were given in writing and were discussed, and we were quite merciless, often, and gradually people got used to this sort of thing. When they first came they were a bit taken aback, but it is astounding what kind of solidarity you can create if you are both on the receiving and the giving end of these reviews. You will soon find out, for example, that you don't get responsible reviews if you don't write any yourself. It's a give-and-take process.

Or somebody would request a staff meeting. He wanted to discuss this or that subject, and then it was arranged for his benefit. The newcomer would participate in all or most of these activities. Upon his arrival he would know a bit about RAND, or let's say, if he was a Russian analyst, he would be of course particularly close to the other Russian analysts, and if not, if he worked on NATO problems, then he would seek at first especially contact with people of his specialization. We had meals together, and we gave him things to read. Well, I think I don't know how else to describe it. It was a gradual, flexible process, no firm or rigid schedule applied invariably. It depended on the person, on the subject, on the area of specialization.

Collins: Okay, but it sounds as if by and large you let the person himself--

Speier: No, not entirely. No, not entirely. Usually the people who came were much too curious to be left alone. They wanted to know what others were doing, and it was customary, I would encourage somebody, "Why don't you go and visit him and tell him what you are doing? He might be interested in it, or he might be able to help you." Or I would tell the newcomer, "Why don't you talk to so-and-so?"

First of all, once he came, he already knew most of the people because he was there once or twice before, and he had probably been taken out for lunch with some others, you know, and they would ask him, "What are you doing? What have you been doing? What would you like to do?" and they would say, "I am doing this and that." It was very easy and very informal, and nothing was regimented, really. I told every newcomer, "If you have any trouble of any kind, come to me, and we'll try to straighten it out." I mean trouble with persons or trouble with a problem, whatever. I observed one rule: whenever possible, defend the analyst against criticism by the administration. When anybody criticized, I'd say, "You don't know them. I do. They are all right," and most of them were. Most of them really were quite sensible and capable and mature people. Sometimes, I might say to the administration, "You may have a point. Let me talk to the man."

Collins: This might also be a good point to interject another aspect of our earlier discussion, that is the question of how salaries were determined initially when people came into the corporation, what the considerations there were.

Speier: Yes. Well, we could never hire anybody holding a position in a government office by offering him more money, because

since we were operating mainly on public funds, this would have been tantamount to one government agency raiding another. This we couldn't do. We could get somebody at work in a government agency only if we were offering him not more than he was making anyway.

Now when it came to academic people who came from a university to us--most of them did--we were guided by other considerations. We had to take into account that the person in an academic job had a long vacation in summertime, between terms, whereas in RAND he had about a month per year, two and one-half days per month, I think. Yes. Exactly. He could accumulate vacation up to a point, but then he had to take it.

Also, in the university he could pocket whatever he made from royalties and from consultantships. In RAND this was not possible. Royalties were not paid to the author on any RAND book; the royalties went to the RAND Corporation since the work had been performed presumably on "government pay." My most successful book on which I might have made a lot of money was a book on the second Berlin crisis which appeared in four languages, including Japanese. Not a cent I got for that. You could collect royalties only on books that had nothing to do with your RAND activities. If you wrote a travelogue on a vacation trip, or a volume of poetry, you might have collected a million on that, but not otherwise.

So it seemed only fair then to ask somebody who came from university X, "What's your salary, and what do you make as a consultant, and what do you earn on royalties? What is your total income from these sources per year, roughly" We were guided by that total as our ceiling, not by his salary alone.

Once a man was in RAND, all limits were off. Then his income depended on his performance. If the performance was outstanding, he could rise very quickly, much faster than at any university or in the government for that matter. But he could also get stuck if he was not very productive. You might say, well, either he changes or he quits, but he has to perform if he wants to stay in RAND, and people either did or did not, you see. I don't know what the turnover was, but I think it was relatively low in the social science division. We had trouble keeping people because once they published a book and it was good, they got offers, and then in order to keep them you had to better the offer. That you could do. You know, if somebody made, I don't know, $10,000 at RAND, and he was offered a job with a salary of $12,000, you could say, "We'll give you the same or even $13,000," and so it went. Some people of course availed themselves of this opportunity to raise their income.

Collins: You've laid out the basic framework now: how the salary structure worked, the interview process, how you acclimated people, and what your rough expectations were. But I'd still like to go back to the beginning and know how you began to build up the social science division. How did you decide where to go to find people? How large did you want the department to be? What was your approach?

Speier: Well, my approach was, first of all, not to make the growth of the division the measure of its success; this was very un-American, I think, because the usual American practice is to regard only that organization as good which grows. I think most of the divisions in RAND operated on that premise, and some had better reason than the social sciences would have had. For example, economists had a good reason, inasmuch as certain specializations developed. Logistics became eventually an independent department. Cost analysis, too, became an independent department. In the social sciences, we could have had proliferation of the original entity or splitting up of parts, if we had had a European versus an Asiatic department within the division, and so on, but nothing came of that. We gradually branched out and added Asia and studies on Japan and Indonesia and so on--again, with language qualifications--to the division, but we didn't make independent departments out of that.

Collins: I guess another way of asking the question is: initially where did you go to find people that you wanted?

Speier: Initially I went to find people among my friends, persons with whom I had worked personally. You see, Paul Kecskemeti was an old friend of mine. I had worked with him when he was in the War Department and I was in the State Department. With Leites, I had worked while both of us were in the FCC, and I had known him already in Berlin. Phil Davison I had met in Germany when he was working for General McClure. Alex George had worked with me in the FCC.

One of the newcomers was in fact a person who was in the social science part of the operation before I was. This was Joe Goldsen. He's now in San Francisco, retired. At the beginning he was sort of the administrative person in the division, without any other specialization. He later edited a book on the social aspects of the earth-circling satellite, I think, with a preface by President [Lyndon B.] Johnson.

What else? Let me see. Then there were other people. Brodie, for example, I hired because I knew that he was the outstanding man in his field. He had written <u>The Absolute Weapon</u>. He was interested in military strategy. Who was the fellow whom you went to see? William Kaufmann, yes, I had met him I think at

Princeton; he had written a book on limited war or something like that, which interested me. I met him there, I interviewed him, and I asked him whether he doesn't want to come to RAND; so this was a recruitment made on the basis of no prior personal contact.

Who else? Dinerstein, the Soviet specialist, and Gouré--I forget how they came to RAND. I know that we wanted to have some specialists who could work on military affairs in the Soviet Union. They had to know Russian. They had to be Soviet specialists. It so happens that they were not considered with equal favor by all RAND-ites.

There was some rivalry and also some backbiting. Of course, in any big organization you get that, and some people in the economics department and other groups felt that the social science department was amateurish when it came to the Soviet Union--with the exception of Leites--which I don't think was the case at all. But Gouré and Dinerstein were attacked, particularly Dinerstein, by some.

Herbert Goldhamer, whom I had also known for many years, was an early member of the department. He had been teaching at Chicago or Stanford at the time, I forget. He thought very, very highly of Fred Iklé and of Andrew Marshall. Fred Iklé had been his student. I interviewed Fred Iklé and I liked him and thought he was a very bright person, which indeed he was, and hired him. He turned out to be a very industrious, extremely gifted person, a bit of a loner, but very, very good.

Similarly with Marshall. He was hired by both the economists and the social science division. He was in both divisions and later opted for being full time in the economics department. He wanted to be only with the economics department because he didn't get along with Dinerstein among others, and I said, "Fine, go there if you are happier there."

Collins: This is Marshall you're talking about?

Speier: Yes, and Marshall was a very close friend of Herb Goldhamer's, and he behaved very, very, how shall I say, nastily, really, toward Dinerstein--which I didn't like--and he was haughty and not very skillful in dealing with people. I had great admiration for him as an excellent statistician, but his strength was not getting along with people. In RAND, he became a close friend and admirer of Albert Wohlstetter's, and very sharp critic of Dinerstein's. Well, these things happen in any organization. I wasn't very happy about this. I talked with Charles Hitch, the head of the economics division, about that--how one person can make life so difficult for two divisions, and he agreed with me, but nothing was done about it. It was good that

nothing was done about it, because Marshall made his career. He's now an important man in the Defense Department. So is Iklé.

Collins: Let's return to the question of the social science department's relationship to universities.

Speier: Yes.

Collins: You mentioned that RAND used stipends to strengthen their ties with the universities. Exactly how did these stipends work? Was this to support say one graduate student, or two or three, and you indicated it was given without strings?

Speier: Yes, it was given without any strings, and I forget the amount. The amount was not terribly large. I don't know whether it was for one or for two or for three per stipend. I think even that depended on the university. We just gave them the funds. I remember the arrangement I made with Columbia University was through a man who at that time was the head I think of the political science department, Fox, W.W. Fox. I had lunch with him in New York and I said, "Look, we have this practice, would you want to have"--I don't know, three, five thousand, whatever it was--"without any strings attached to support graduate work?"

And he looked and he said, "Fine, thank you." That was it.

Collins: Was this a discretionary budget that you had at your disposal, or did you have to go to Goldstein and say, this is what we'd like to do?

Speier: Oh, sure. That had to be approved first on top. Yes, and particularly an exception. A particular exception was Berlin, because it was abroad--American money given to foreigners, you see--and I persuaded Frank and Goldy that it was for the good purpose of helping to rebuild the university in West Berlin, and it was approved. Next time I was in Berlin--I've traveled almost every year to Europe since '45. I have been to Europe I think every year. I went to Berlin and told them, "Would you want it? We'll give it to you."

They said, "Sure we want it," but almost invariably they asked, "What are the strings?"

And I said, "None. We do it to see good work done, help some of your students to do good work without financial worries, and you decide on the students, you decide on the work, everything is up to you." Those were the terms.

Collins: Did the students know that some of their support would be coming from RAND?

Speier: I don't know. I have no idea. Even that we did not make a condition. No. I don't know.

Collins: In the early period, what were the major university centers for study of the various aspects of social science that RAND was interested in? What universities did you want to develop ties with?

Speier: We didn't want to develop ties with any university. We wanted to develop ties with persons whose work we knew, and it made no difference to us where they were. It so happened that we had consultants in Chicago and at Princeton and at Yale and I think at Harvard. [Henry] Kissinger later was a consultant before he became more famous. And NYU. Yes, New York University.

Collins: You already mentioned Columbia.

Speier: Columbia, yes. We had certain other possibilities. We asked people to come for the summer. Life in California is pleasant under the palm trees, and people liked to come to California, if they get paid for it, during their academic vacations. Yes, Harvard we also made arrangements; we had somebody come from there. They came, and we agreed on some work they would be doing or where they could help, or we organized a conference where they would participate and then stay on afterwards to work out certain things.

I remember one conference we organized where we asked people from various universities on the subject of the role of the military in underdeveloped countries. It had occurred to us that very frequently the military were the promoters of progress, and at the same time they were also the promoters of unrest or of their own government. So we wanted to study this a little more fully, and organized a conference on the subject, and asked people who were experts on the Middle East, on East Asia and on South America to get together. The papers presented at the RAND conference were published as a symposium volume, as a book.

Or somebody came to me and would say, "Look, I need one particular help on this subject, and the person who really is the best man on this aspect of my work is so-and-so in this-or-that place. Can't we get him to come here in summer?"

I said, "I'll try," if I was convinced that it was a reasonable request, and he was not only trying to get a friend here to spend the summer on the beaches.

On the other hand, we had the institution of sabbaticals sometimes. If somebody had been with the organization--I got two

sabbaticals while at RAND, after the first seven years, after the second seven years. Not after the third seven years because then I was so close to retirement that I didn't ask for it anymore. But sometimes somebody would have an offer from a university to come there for a year, but they would be able to pay him only less than he was making at RAND, so he would come and say, "I'd very much like to accept this, have a breather from this pressure at RAND or do something else once and be free to publish what I write. Can't this be arranged?"

I said, "Yes, I'll see whether we can't make up for the difference in salary."

RAND was very generous within reason. We would do this. It was done for me, too. I was one year at the so-called Ford Center at Stanford there for the behavioral sciences, in '56-'57, and then for another year in New York at the Council on Foreign Relations. In both cases RAND continued to pay the bill for the medical insurance that they used to pay for employees. The fringe benefits were very good while you were at RAND, and unless otherwise arranged, you lost them when you took a leave.

Those were, incidentally, advantages that should be considered in connection with the salary setup, and also the pension system was generous in one respect: the contribution that RAND made to the fund was fairly large. I forget now what the percentages were, but I think it was more than fifty percent. I forget. I just don't know anymore.

And yet the pension that you got paid out--now it may be better--but at my time it was not so hot because in the first years that I was with RAND, RAND personnel was not on Social Security. RAND did not qualify for this. For the first almost ten years I believe, they had an arrangement with Aetna for the pension fund, from which I still get part of my pension. For the first ten years with RAND, I get altogether $300 a month.

Collins: Not generous by today's standards.

Speier: No, and it has never changed, you see. It was a fixed amount that you had, depending on the number of years you were with the organization. They later changed it. I get a small pension from Social Security because RAND joined the system so late, that the pension is small, and in addition to that they are on TIAA and CREF, as most universities are.

Collins: Well, we were talking about the relationship to the university world. Typically during the summertimes, how many university researchers might come out to RAND to interact with the staff?

Speier: You mean as semipermanent residents there? I couldn't tell you exactly. It might be, for the social science division perhaps, between two and five, but for the rest of RAND, I don't know.

Collins: Would you try to do some kind of conference every summer, or was that just kind of a sporadic activity?

Speier: No, not every summer. We would try to get some people whom we would have liked to have on the staff, and who couldn't come or didn't want to come but might come for the summer. Then we would ask them. Sometimes even without having a special project in mind, leaving it up to them what they wanted to work on, just for the interchange with the staff and so on. There was a benefit in that in itself, of course, because if you are in an organization like this, what you have to watch out for--it seems to me I should have watched out for and did watch out for--was that it doesn't become sterile because there isn't enough circulation of new faces and minds. You know? There's something to be said for getting a new viewpoint, even if you don't have a particular assignment for the man right away. If he is a good person, he will respond to a new environment and give you something by his very presence, or through his very presence. I learned a lot about management.

Collins: I think that's an important question, because how you manage this kind of activity I think is really kind of key to understanding the RAND effort.

Speier: Yes.